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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43551 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
· BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 10/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 01:16 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-PC-2015-02841 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
2/25/2015 MOAF CCMURPST Motion & Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on District Court Clerk 
Partial Payment of Court Fees 
PETN CCMURPST Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief District Court Clerk 
AFFD. CCMURPST First Affidavit of Petitioner District Court Clerk 
MOTN CCMURPST Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Underlying District Court Clerk 
Criminal Records and Transcripts 
MISC CCMURPST Waiver of Attorney/ Client Privilege District Court Clerk 
MOTN CCMURPST Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of District Court Clerk 
Counsel 
CERT CCMURPST Certificate Of Mailing 'District Court Clerk 
CHGA CCMURPST Judge Change: Administrative Cheri Copsey (DUI 
Court) 
3/2/2015 CHGA CCMURPST Judge Change: Administrative Cheri C. Copsey 
3/4/2015 PROS PRSMITTJ Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn Cheri C. Copsey 
3/5/2015 MOTN CCMYERHK Motion For Scheduling Order Cheri C. Copsey 
3/9/2015 ORDR CCMASTLW Order Granting Appointment of Counsel Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCMASTLW Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Cheri C. Copsey 
04/15/2015 03:00 PM) 
3/24/2015 NOAP TCLAFFSD Notice Of Appearance (Fuisting for Leytham) Cheri C. Copsey 
MOTN TCLAFFSD Motion To Release PSI Cheri C. Copsey 
MOTN TCLAFFSD Motion For Stay of Proceedings And For Leave Cheri C. Copsey 
To Amend Petition 
3/26/2015 ORDR CCMASTLW Order Releasing PSI Cheri C. Copsey 
4/6/2015 MOTN CCRADTER Motion for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 
4/10/2015 ORDR CCMASTLW Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 
4/15/2015 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Cheri C. Copsey 
on 04/15/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
05/27/2015 03:00 PM) 
STAT CCMASTLW STATUS CHANGED: inactive Cheri C. Copsey 
4/22/2015 MISC CCMASTLW Transcript Filed Cheri C. Copsey 
5/26/2015 MOTN CCMYERHK Motion For Permission To Conduct Deposition Of Cheri C. Copsey 
Counsel, Brian Neville And Brian Blender 
5/27/2015 DCHH CCMASTLW Hearing result for Review Hearing scheduled on Cheri C. Copsey 
05/27/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 
5/29/2015 OBJT CCHOLDKJ Objection to Depositions Cheri C. Copsey 
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Date: 10/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 01:16 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 2 Case: CV-PC-2015-02841 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
6/3/2015 ORDR DCDANSEL Order Denying Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
6/17/2015 HRSC CCMASTLW Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Cheri C. Copsey 
06/17/2015 04:00 PM) 
DCHH CCMASTLW Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Cheri C. Copsey 
on 06/17/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Maria Glodowski 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 
6/30/2015 AFFD CCSNELNJ Second and Final Affidavit of Jimmy Leytham in Cheri C. Copsey 
Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
7/8/2015 ORDR CCMASTLW Order Lifting Stay of Proceedings Cheri C. Copsey 
7/27/2015 ANSW CCGRANTR Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey 
(Dunn for The State of Idaho) 
MOSJ CCGRANTR Motion For Summary Dismissal Cheri C. Copsey 
8/24/2015 OBJT TCLAFFSD Objection To Motion For Summary Dismissal Cheri C. Copsey 
8/28/2015 ORDR DCDUMOKA Order Granting Summary Judgment Dismissal Cheri C. Copsey 
JDMT DCDUMOKA Judgment Cheri C. Copsey 
CDIS DCDUMOKA Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,, Cheri C. Copsey 
Other Party; Leytham, Jimmy Dale, Subject. 
Filing date: 8/28/2015 
STAT DCDUMOKA STATUS CHANGED: Closed Cheri C. Copsey 
9/8/2015 NOTA CCWRIGRM NOTICE OF APPEAL Cheri C. Copsey 
9/10/2015 ORDR' CCMASTLW Order Appointing SAPD Cheri C. Copsey 
10/28/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Cheri C. Copsey 
43551 
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Jimmy D. Leytham 
#16742, ISCI Unit 10 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Petitioner 
• 
.CHER~ C. COPSEY 
NO·-----::::-::,,,.--,---
FILED !7,' r '2,._ A.M. _____ P.M ..... ~..__=J--
FEB 2 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
8:,1 SEAN MURPHY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
oOo 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, • ,; • ..-· ;, , , :; I . ,·:'"Ill rlf'~. \i ... ,//i \{ )i ,: ' { \ /' \ C' C j.f' -




VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, Jimmy Dale Leytham, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned 
cause, pursuant to Sections 19-4901 - 4911, Idaho Code, presents this Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is in the custody of the State Board of Corrections, housed 
at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, Boise, Idaho. 
2. The sentencing court which imposed the judgment/sentence was the Fourth 
Judicial District, County of Ada. 
3. The case number and offense for the sentence imposed is: 
a. Case Number CR-FE-2014-0003478; 
b. Offense: COUNT II Forgery, Felony, Section 18-3601, Idaho Code. 
4. Date of Sentence: December 31, 201'1, before the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, 
District Judge presiding. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
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S. Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to plea negotiations in which he 
agreed to plead to COUNT II, Forgery, I.C. 18-3601, and Count(s) I and II 
were dismissed. 
6. Other filings: Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on the 
district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Order. 
7. Petitioner has requested the appointment of conflict free counsel and 
has submitted with this filing a Motion and Affidavit for Appointment of Conflict 
Fee Counsel. 
8. Petitioner is seeking waiver of fees and costs in this matter and has 
submitted a Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment 
of Court Fees (Prisoner). 
9. Petitioner hereby sets forth the following claims for post-conviction 
relief which are contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal and State Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and the conviction resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the state district court proceedings. 
Claim One 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: 
Failure to Conduct Investigation 
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was constitutionally ineffective 
for failing to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation. As a result, this violated 
Petitioners "right to counsel" and "due process of law" as guaranteed by the 6th 
and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Section 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
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13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510 (2003); among others. 
Claim Two 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: 
Guilty Plea Ineffectiveness 
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was ineffective for failing to 
make an adequate investigation into his case, and explanation of trial strategy, 
prior to entering a guilty plea due to Trial Counsel's assurances that he would 
receive probation by pleading guilty. As a result, this violated Petitioners 
"right to counsel" and "due process of law", as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the 
Constitution of the state of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 
1973); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010); Laffler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 
1376 (2012); Missouri v. Fry, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Booth v. State,151 Idaho 
612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011); amons others. 
Claim Three 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: 
Breakdown In Communications Between Defendant and Counsel 
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was ineffective for failing to 
communicate with Petitioner in order to subject the prosecution's case to a 
meaningful adversary testing process. As a result, this violated Petitioners 
"right to counsel" and "due process of law", as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
000007
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the 
Constitution of the state of Idaho. See: U.S. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); 
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005), among others. 
10. Petitioner further supports the above listed Federal Claims with a 
statment of facts in the "First Affidavit of Petitione" that sets forth the 
factual basis of his Federal Claims to this state Court and is incorporated 
herein as if restated in its entirety. 
11. Petitioner seeks the following relief: 
a) ORDER respondent to respond to this Verified Petition within 30 
days of filing in accordance with Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a); 
b) ORDER an evidentiary hearing to be held on these matters before 
the state trial court pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4907 in order to properly 
expand the record further; 
c) FIND and DECLARE for Petitioner on his Federal Constitutional 
Claims presented herein, by addressing with aid of the First Affidavit of 
Petitioner and Exhibits, underlying criminal records and transcripts; ISSUE 
ITS WRIT for Post-Conviction Relief VACATING the Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment Order for Petitioner would have entered plea negotiations in a 
completely different posture; and 
d) GRANT any further relief that justice may so permit. 
Respectfully submitted this .i!:L_ day of ~~__.b __ ·~~~' 2015. 
rmf¥~ Jim y Dale eyt am, etitioner 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Ada 
I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, being sworn under oath states follows: 
I am the Petitioner in the above-captioned VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF, and have read the contents therein, and that all statements 
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
2015. 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this'2:1._ day of~~ 
Notary Public for Id~ \ 
Commission expires: ~e) 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I placed an original of the foregoing in the Prison Legal 
Mail System to be filed by the Clerk of the Court and a true and correct copy 
to be forwarded via U.S. Mail to: 
Original to: 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
Copy to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
tr ~a~ L~Petitioner 




Jimmy D. Leytham 
Full Name of Party Filing Document 
#16742, ISCI Unit 10 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
PO BOX 14 
City, State and Zip Code 
Boise, ID 83707 
Telephone 
NO·-----==___,..,,,.. __ _ 
FILED g':s-z. A.M. ____ ,P.M. ___ _ 
FEB 2 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SEAN MURPHY 
Dt:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EQIJRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _A __ DA _______ _ 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM 
Petitioner, 
vs. 






'4J ~ .. , I",'. ~ r-, fJ IJ • " 
I I i._~ {) ·!.!, .i 
----------
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
. Petitioner asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court fees, 
and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) Post-Conviction Relief Action . I 
believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for. 
2. Ix] I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. D I have filed this claim against the 
same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court. 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO PN 1-14 6/8/2011 
PAGE 1 
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
years. 
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages if more space is needed for 
any response.) 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: Jimmy Dale Leytham Other name(s) I have used: _______ _ 
Address: #16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO BOX 14, Boise, ID 83707 
How long at that address? / tJ {} f),'-'f - Phone: ~ /Jo No-f JVO 
Year and place of birth: /~ ZJagC//VLe__ :?.() 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am D single [&1 married. If married, you must provide the following information: 
Name of spouse: if a y Ge-. It /... Qyf-iyorn. 
'l6t' w t3 d1'.5 e st'' kh 11/1), ;£,/] ~ <?J61y 
My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: ___ _ 
/Ve! I(/~ 
INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ 3rY: uu per o week~ month w, · ~ 
:;i: u/~5 a,fJ /J,'J~);d'fJ.f ~t,f-- p:.I /'f'vc~{l-<-
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED PAGE 2 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011 
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Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: J'"tce ~v<f~ 
/ ~ I IX/ e U €(.l y h l-</ JZ-fl i,,(r:. 
My spouse's income: $38"Y-·cd perOweek~month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your Legal 
Address City State Description Value 
~61Jw St11'.se Sr k,17 IV~ w .JtJl'Jv Jlji·t' 
0 W./L J '31.: e,vU 
List all other property owned by you and state its value. 
Equity 
~ 
Description (provide description for each item) Value 
Cash IYIY !.vi& 3;,y. tW /Yl<'tv/i,, · 
Notes and Receivables /vtl µ-e_, -~...;;;.... _ _____________ _ 
Vehicles /9<i7 fvtl../J fJ,'ck tfl f'CJo,c:01--odb f?:>A1Je>&f)/a1<~A. t~o,,d) ~·· 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts CAI if;,$/ i-d. J' o ,c:,u 
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit ____ -"-M-~_M_~ _ _ 
Trust Funds Jl/O ,lf./e -----------------------
Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s. _________ ;_µ_v_/f/_e: ___ _ 
Cash Value lnsurance ____________ __..,A&---'-_//1_<.--___ _ 
Motorcycles/Boat~/Snowmobiles. _____________ _ 
Furniture/Appliances. ___________________ _ 
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles ________________ _ 




TVs/Stereos/Computers/Electronics 11/, /PCJ ,ca St,efto S-ortt> Cb ;tJ/Jlffr,A /ft(l ,tfXJ 
Tools/Equipment I/Git/() 1tt a /S 1,,00,dl 
Sporting Goods/Guns. __ f __ , .... ~·--4__,_/J_D_/( __ $..__ _________ _ ~ 
Horses/Livestock/Tack µ o IV -e, 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED PAGE 3 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO F'V'l 1-14 6/8/2011 
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• 




RenUHouse Payment _ _,_'f__.S:...__4'-=-'-~--------------
Vehicle Payment(s) _______________ M;__o__;.~---'=---
Credit Cards (List last four digits of each ao::ount number.) 





Clothing _______________________ _ 
Auto Fuel. ______________________ _ 
Auto Maintenance ---------------------
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons ------------------
EntertainmenVBooks/Magazines _______________ _ 
Home lnsurance ______ w ____ /__ f.A,,, ___ ..... P_,N....,..... .... 1/J1114'1 ..................... ____ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 










Auto Insurance fr// J111/-G 
Monthly Payment .. _,, -~ 
~~~ bf'll,0¥,-K 
Life Insurance --------------------- ~d] 
~.~~ 
IQO,t:-(J ~ 
Medic a I lnsurance.._/_~ _  ....__ _ &_k ___ +'_. __,C/.. .... ..... 1-t .... fv_" ______ _ 
Medical Expense ____________ fJ,_'e)l_cfllPi __ .--'--'-~~µ __ _ 
Other _______________________ _ 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
How much can you borrow? $ lt/0 ~ From whom? WtJod17 ·-< 
When did you file your last income tax return? ?-,ol5 kJ, Amount of refund:$ ()(.)lt/f-' JU~ 
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.) 
Name 
Jimmy Dale Leytham 
Typed/printed 
STATE OF IDAHO 







SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this 11 day of ~ ?t,/:S-
1' 
Nota~ 
Residing at ~ ~ 
Commission expires w:~ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
PAGE5 
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. . 
Jimmy D. Leytham 
#16742, ISCI Unit 10 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
NO·----...,,.,,..,=--,~~=----
FILED (?,-s '2... A.M. _____ P.M. ___ _ 
FEB 2 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SEAN MURPHY 
DEP\JH 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
oOo 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 








FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, being sworn under oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned cause, and presents the 
following to support the Claims I have set froth in my Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief that is presently before this Court for its consideration. 
2. I am over the age of 18 years of age and competent to offer the following 
statements. 
3. I was told my attorney was from the firm of Bender Law Office, and that 
my attorneys name was Mr. Brian Nevell. 
4. Mr Brian Nevell told me that he needed to recuse Judge Nevell because 
he was a relative of Brian Nevell. (Father). 
5. During the entire time that Brian Nevell was my attorney, I placed more than 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 1 
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twenty, (20), telphone calls to his Office for him. He never returned any of 




I believe that Mr. Nevell was appointed to my case in February of 
I asked Mr. Nevell numerous times to try to get me a binding Rule 11 
plea agreement. He stated to me, "Judge Copsy will not allow those". 
8. I asked Mr. Nevell to recuse Judge Copsy. He told me, "Why, she is 
fair". He, (Mr. Nevell), then informed me that he and his family, and Judge 
Copsy are such good friends that they spend the holidays together with their 
families. 
9. I was scheduled for a Court hearing on September 10th, 2014. I 
spoke to Mr. Nevell and he told me that he would contact me on the 7th, of 
September, 2014, to see if I could reschedule the Court date of the 10th. 
I asked this to be rescheduled because I had a job out of town and I did 
not know if I could get back before the Court date. 
10. Mr. Nevell never did contact me as to whether or not my Court date 
was rescheduled. 
11. When I returned from out of town, I did make it to my Court date on 
the 10th, of September, 2014. However, Mr. Nevell did not show up. He forgot 
about me, and my Court date. A Mr. Brian Bender filled in for Mr. Nevell; but 
Mr. Bender did not know about my case. 
12. My Wife called Mr. Nevell's telephone several times to find out what 
was going on and what happened to him at the Court date. There was never any 
type of return call from Mr. Nevell. 
13. When I spoke to Mr. Nevell in person, he explained that he had this 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 2 
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., 
"great deal" worked out for me. I explained to Mr. Nevell that I did not 
want to enter into a guilty plea as I was not guilty. 
14. Mr. Nevell informed me, " •• hey, do not worry about it, just plead 
guilty, and they are going to give to you probation". 
15. At the time I appeared before the Court, the Court read to me the 
Guilty plea advisory form. When I was asked if, " ••• there has been any type of 
promises to you," Mr. Nevell told me to say that there was no promises. I asked 
about the probation he had promised, Mr. Nevell told me, " ••• that is not what 
the Court is asking about". 
16. I informed Mr. Nevell, "sir, I need some time to think about this". 
Mr. Nevell told me, "Hey, this is a done deal, you are going to get probation, 
so you have about 15 minutes, just plead guilty and you will get probation". 
17. I did as my attorney advised me to do. I entered the plea of guilty. 
However, when the Court sentenced me, I received a sentence of ten, (10) years. 
Five years fixed or determinate, followed by five years indeterminate. 
18. I do not believe that Mr. Nevell was truthful in this case. He coerced 
me into a plea of guilty under the promise that I would only receive a term of 
probation. 
19. I do not believe that Mr. Nevell effectively represented me in this 
case. I believe that he had an interest in not making his family friend, Judge 
Copsy, made at him for seeking a binding Rule 11 plea agreement. 
20. I believe that Mr. Nevell placed his interest before my interests. I 
was told that I would receive a term of probation. I did not, and I have been 
harmed by the misrepresentations of Mr. Brian Nevell. 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 3 
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• . ',. 
OATII OF AFFIANT 
I, Jimmy D. Leytham, do hereby Swear, under the penalty of perjury, as 
applicable to me under the laws of the State of Idaho, that the information 
contained in this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
f..-19'-!PIJ 
Dated 




FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 4 
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State of 




Jimmy D. Leytham 
#16742, ISCI Unit 10 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Petitioner 
NO. _________ _ 
FILED .,& . -S7 A.M. _____ P.M. __ _,, 
FEB 2 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SEAN MURPHY 
DEPUl"Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
oOo 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, q q O 1''. 4J r ,-, .,..'°11 r; . . 1 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No; _:. __ ,_. _ .. --'-· _ .. ,_\_. -' .... (_.'fi_.,.-~_1""4"""·"'-"lr-1 
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL RECORDS 
AND TRANSCRIPTS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, Jimmy Dale Leytham, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned 
cause, pursuant to Rule 201(d), of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, moves this Court 
for an Order to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal records and 
transcripts in the case of State of Idaho v. Jimmy Dale Leytham, Case Number 
CR-FE-2014-0003478, Ada County, to include but not limited to the following: 
1. The entire underlying criminal record; 
2. Transcript from the underlying criminal case, to include the guilty 
plea hearing, and sentencing hearing; 
3. The Guilty Plea Advisory Form that was used at the Guilty Plea Hearing; 
4. The Presentence Investigation Report; 
S. The Clerk's Record and Reporters Transcript which was lodged in the 
appeal of the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Order; 
6. The Presentence Investigation Report. 
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
000020
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A post-conviction relief proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case 
from which it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in which the applicant 
hears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Paridis v. State, 110 
Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306 (Idaho 1986). No part of the record from the 
criminal case becomes part of the record in the post-conviction proceeding 
unless it is entered as an exhibit. Exhibits, as well as transcripts of the 
pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case, 
even if previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not 
before the trial court in the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part 
of the record on appeal unless presented to the trial court as exhibits. Roman 
v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App. 1994); Wolf v. State, 
152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct.App. 2011), or unless the trial court 
takes judicial notice of such records from the criminal case. Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 201. Esqivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258, n.3 233 P.3d 186, 189 n.3 
(Ct.App. 2010). See also Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 799 (Ct.App. 2012). 
Based upon the foregoing it is requested this Court take judicial notice 
of the underlying criminal records and transcripts, and those other documents 
that are identified above as an Exhibit, and grant any further relief justice 
may so allow. 
DATED this Jj__ day of _h_-e._lJ ____ · ____ , 2015. 





I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant 
to Idaho Code Section 19-1406, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
b , 1, -1,.0/f 
Date 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I submitted an original to the Clerk of the Court for 
filing and a true and correct copy via the Prison Legal Mail System to be 
forwarded via the U.S. Mail to: 
Original to: 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk 
Fourth District Court 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
Copy to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 3 
Date 
000022
. . e 
NO.-----:=::-;:,:::-----:::----
FILED ~S2 A.M. _____ P.M.-"""'-="-----
FEB 2 5 2015 
Jimmy D. Leytham 
#16742, ISCI Unit 10 
PO Box 14 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SEAN MURPHY 
Boise, ID 83707 
Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
oOo 
CV PC 1 S 
Case No. · 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
DEPUTY 
Petitioner, Ref: -CR---F-E--2-0-1-4--0-0-0~3-48=7----
vs. WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, do hereby acknowledge the following: 
1. I have submitted to the District Court a Verified Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief for its consideration, and have asked for the Court 
to appoint conflict free counsel to represent me in these matters. 
2. I was represented by Brian P. Neville, Attorney at Law, in Ada 
County Case CR-FE-2014-0003487, in which I plead guilty to the offense of 
Forgery, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-3601. 
3. The testimony of Mr. Neville regarding CR-FE-2014-0003487 is vital 
to my Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which is submitted with 
this Wavier of Attorney/Client Privilege for the Court's consideration. 
4. By signing this document, I hereby waive my attorney/client 
privilege in CR-FE-2014-0003487. 
WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE - 1 
000023
• 
DATED this J!l_ day of ___ r_ ...... -e_b;;___. -----' 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




ON this~ day of ~~t , 2015, before me a Notary Public in 
and for this State of Idaho, person~lly and in person appeared JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM 
and proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person named in 
and who executed the foregoing Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same as his voluntary act and deed for the uses and 
purposes therein mentioned. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year first above written. 
WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE - 2 
Nota --;;i,"ii,. for Ida~ I 
Commission expires :f 'P-zeJ 
000024
r 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I submitted an original of the foregoing to the Clerk 
of the Court for filing and a true and correct copy via the Prison Legal Mail 
System to be forwarded via the U.S. Mail to: 
Original to: 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
Copy to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney: 
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE - 3 
000025
Inmate name Jimmy D. Leytham 
IDOC No. 16742, !SCI Unit 10 
Address PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
Petitioner 
II NO·----;=;-:-::::::-----:-~--
FILED x:,·s2 AM. _____ P.M.-.. ______ _ 
FEB 2 5 20!5 
CHRISTOPHER D, RICH, Clerk 
By SEAN MURPHY 
DE~UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT --------
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF-'A=D=A ____ _ 






STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 










, Petitioner in the above 
entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
under the direct care, custody and control of Warden __ K_e_it_h_Y_o_r_d..._y ________ _.. 
ofthe Idaho State Correctional Instituiton, Boise. 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner 
to properly pursue. Petitioner lacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself. 
3. Petitioner required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she was unable to 
do it him/herself 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1 
Revised: I 0/14/05 
000026
4. Petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and therefore 
needs conflict free counsel appointed in these matters. 
DA TED this 1!!f_ day of~E??..6-· -=.,. ---1.-'--____ _,, 20 )£_. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of_ ....... A .. D""'A ____ ) 
J~I=MMY~-'D""'A'"'"L~E~L=E_YTH_AM ___ ~, Petitioner, after first being duly sworn upon his/her 
oath, deposes and says as follows: 
I. I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
2. I am currently residing at the Idaho State Correctional Instituiton 
under the care, custody and control ofWarden_K_e_i_t_h_Y_o_r_d_y _____ _ 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2 
Revised: 10/14/05 
000027
. ' . 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
it's Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest, 
or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to. 
DATED This _d day of ~ , 20..f._£. 
~Wt~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this fl day 
~ ,.--of __ ~~"'-=-'----'' 20_LL. 
(SEAL) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing via 
Prison Legal Mail System to be forwarded via U.S. Mail to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
~O·~ 
JimmyD. Leytham 
-J,i- I t:J- -u:,!J 
Date 




Wednesday, February 25. 2015 at 09:11 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY: 4---· -~;t" 
De utyClerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Jimmy Dale Leytham, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-02841 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties or 
attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
(INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL) 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
(COPY IN FILE) 
Jimmy D. Leytham # 16742 
ISCI Unit 10 PO Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 




... i ' ',) ~ r( r' 
"·""%,"t':.,i',(' -~ ii ._/',,·.~ ·' 
Dated: ~~dri:esday, Febniaty25, 2015 
CHRI~QPHER Q. RICH 




0\0 ( IS '2;/t 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
• 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No. 5287 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 




Fl~.M A.~4. _ ~ ~~~~ 
MAR O 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
MOTION FOR SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and moves this Court for a scheduling 
order permitting filing of the Answer more than thirty days from the filing of the petition. 
The petitioner has moved for post-conviction relief and has requested counsel. In the 
event that counsel is appointed, the landscape of the post-conviction claims may vary 
widely from the current petition. Idaho Code 19-4906 provides that the Answer is due 
within 30 days, "or within any further time the court may fix." The State asks that the Court 
MOTION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER (LEYTHAM) Page 1 1 
000030
• 
fix the due date of the Answer after the decision on the defendant's motion for counsel. The 
State asks for sufficient time from the issuance of the Court's order to provide an Answer. 
Al ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this K day o:CF@bruary, 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVI_<jf,,. AJA 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of~ ~ 5, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing State's Motion for Scheduling Order was served to: in the manner 
noted below: 
Jimm)' D. Leytham, IDOC No. 16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO Box 14, Boise, Idaho 83707 
~ depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
first class. 
CJ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
CJ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
CJ By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the fac 




























• No.---liiiali!j~~--,1--A.M ____ _, • -
MAR o g 2c:5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~IPl'ffleR D. RICH,'"'' 'rl 
By BETH MASTERS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA DEPurv 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 




On January 2, 2015, in Case No. CR-FE-2014-0003478, the Court imposed an aggregate 
sentence of ten (10) years with five (5) years fixed followed by five (5) years indeterminate on 
Count II, Forgery, Felony, LC. § 18-3601. In CR-FE-2014-0005269, the Court imposed an 
aggregate sentence of five (5) years with zero (0) years fixed followed by five (5) years 
indeterminate on Count II, Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, LC. § 18-
3125, -3128, to run consecutively to CR-FE-2014-0003478. He was represented by Brian Neville. 
Leytham appealed and that appeal is pending. Leythma filed a post-conviction Petition on 
February 25, 2015, and requested the Court appoint counsel. Based on the documents in the file, 
pursuant to LC.§§ 19-4904, 19-852, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ada County Public Defender is appointed to represent 
the Defendant in prosecuting the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The appointed counsel is to 
file a Notice of Appearance within 20 days. The State shall not answer the Petition at this time. 
Furthermore, the Court hereby provides the Ada County Public Defender and Ada County 
Prosecutor's Office copies of the Petition, accompanying memoranda, any transcripts and requests 
the Public Defender review them to determine if conflict counsel should be appointed. A status 
conference is scheduled for April IS: 2015, at 3:00 p.m. Counsel for Leytham and for the State 
shall appear. The Court further orders Leytham has waived his attorney client privilege. The 
Defendant shall not file any more material pro se. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 9th day of March 2015. 
ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 













l - • • 
The undersigned authority hereby certifies that on 1_kz_ March 2015 I mailed, by United 
States Mail, one copy of the ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
KAI WITTWER 
SHAWNA DUNN 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
AUGUST CAHILL 
BRIAN NEVILLE 
300 W. MYRTLE STREET, STE. 200 
BOISE, ID 83702 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM 
12 #16742 
I.S.C.I. UNIT 10 
13 PO Box 14 














CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By ~ltL~ji .. ~ ·· 
Deputy cf erk c.., " . 
ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-02841 2 
000033
MAR 2 4 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
TO: The state of Idaho, by and through the Ada County Prosecutor, and to this 
Honorable Court. 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby notified that pursuant to the Court's ORDER 
appointing the Office of the Ada County Public Defender on March 9, 2015, the defendant 
above-named is now being represented and is appearing in the above-entitled action by and 
through the Ada County Public Defender-LANCE L. FUISTING, Deputy Public Defender, 
appearing on behalf of the }\da County Public Defender for the defendant above-named. 
DATED, this 2!rdday of March 2015. 
LANC~ CFJTm~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 1 
000034
• 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 1/~ day of March 2015, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
SHAWNA DUNN 
Deputy Prosecutor, Ada County 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 2 
000035
• 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Lance Fuisting 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
~'\) 
NO. \0 ALED 
A.M. -~ _P.M. ___ _ 
MAR 2 4 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2014-0003478 
CR-FE-2014-0005269 
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2015-2841) 
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 
COMES NOW, LANCE L. FUISTING of the Ada County Public Defender's Office, 
court-appointed counsel for JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, and moves this Court, pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32, for an order releasing the presentence investigation report prepared 
in the above-entitled case number to undersigned counsel. 
The defendant recently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. CV-PC-
2015-2841. Subsequent to petitioner's filing, the Ada County Public Defender's Office was 
appointed to represent the above-named defendant in post-conviction proceedings. To aid 
undersigned counsel in the post-conviction proceedings and familiarize counsel with the 
defendant's case, counsel respectfully requests this Court release a copy of the presentence 
investigation report generated in the above-entitled case number. 
DATED this 2Yd day of March 2015. 
L~ 
LANCE L. FUISTING 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 1 
000036
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rct day of March 2015, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to SHAWNA DUNN, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by placing the 
same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
Quincy K. Harris 
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI 2 
000037
t,; \;, 0 l e..-~ t Gfy/f '? 
1,/_·2.5/tLJ/<j e ~.: \Q~ ::'% ___ _ ' ' 
MAR 2 4 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Lance Fuisting 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841 
MOTION FOR STAY OF 
PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEA VE 
TO AMEND PETITION 
COMES NOW the petitioner, JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, by and through his attorney, 
LANCE FUISTING, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and moves this Court for an 
order staying proceedings and allowing the petitioner to amend his petition after a 
discussion of issues with appointed counsel. The petitioner requests a stay of 90 days in 
order to review the file, receive and review a copy of the presentence investigation report, 
receive and review transcripts, and prepare an amended petition. 
DATED this 2Yd day of March 2015. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
~ MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 1 
000038
• 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this z3rct day of March 2015, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to SHAWNA DUNN, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by placing the 
same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
f{Lv4/4~ 
Quincy K. Harris iJ-
MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION 2 
000039
Re,cE\\JEO 
.. ,.. ~ 
\4~R 1 ~ '", 
C\er\<. 
J)..d'a ~~ COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Lance Fuisting 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
• 
W.m,~ FILED \ • ~u 
.ul·----P.M._....-J _ 
MAR 2 6 2~~5 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 1....,"; 
By BETH MASTERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2015-2841) 
ORDER RELEASING PSI 
This matter having come before the court upon court-appointed counsel's motion, and 
for good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants counsel's Motion to Release PSI. 
A copy of the presentence investigation report prepared on behalf of the defendant in the 
above-entitled case number shall be made available for review to LANCE L. FUISTING, 
court-appointed counsel for the defendant in Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841, to aid counsel in 
preparation of the pending post-conviction proceedings. 
Counsel is to make no copies of the report, shall not disclose the report to any other 
person outside the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and shall surrender said copy to 
this Court upon completion of the defendant's post-conviction proceedings in Case No. CV-
PC-2015-2841. Failure to comply with any portion of Idaho Criminal Rule 32 may be 
deemed a contempt of court and may be subject to appropriate sanctions. 
IT IS SO ORDER¥J2. 
DATED this 8,~-day of March 2015. 
CHERIC. COP~ ~ 
District Judge 
ORDER RELEASING PSI 
000040
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
e 
:-_-:-_-.:_ -_-_ "ff.ji_,t"E~.t::--z".""~-~---
APR O 6 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TENILLE RAD 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) __________ ) 
Case No. CV PC 2015 02841 
MOTION FOR WAIVER OF 
ATTORNEY /CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its Order waiving the attorney/client 
privilege for the following reason: 
Petitioner JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM claims, inter alia, that his attorney Brian 
Neville provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cannot explore this issue 
without access to information which is subject to the attorney/client privilege. See 
Evidence Rules 502 and 513. The State therefore asks this Court to find that Petitioner 
has waived the attorney/client privilege for purposes of these proceedings, as to all 
MOTION FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE (LEYTHAM), Page 1 
000041
.. 
information held by Brian Neville which is relevant, or which may lead to evidence 
relevant to Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
-cc--, 
DATED this _1i day of April, 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this f,./A- day of April, 2015, I caused to be 
served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Waiver of Attorney/Client 
Privilege upon the individual( s) named below in the manner noted: 
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St. 
Rom 1107, Boise, Idaho 83702 
a By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first 
class. 
f By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
a By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
a By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: ___ _ 









JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
APR l tt l01S" 
CHRISTOPHER ~}"i'. Ci. 
By BETH MA.:>! ,_rc,, 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF 
ATTORNEY/CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
The Court having heard the motion heretofore made in the above proceedings of JIMMY 
DALE LEYTHAM vs. The State ofldaho, by Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attorney/client privilege is waived, as to all 
information held by Brian Neville concerning Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
only. 
--<---t 
DATED this j_ r.J.ay of April, 2015. 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE (LEYTHAM), Page 1 
000043
Wilper for Copsey/Nelson.san Gambee 041515 • Courtroom508 
Time Speaker Note 
2:45:25 PM i. 
2:45:25 PM !Judge !calls LEYTHAM v STATE OF IDAHO CV PC 15 02841 
! ! STATUS CONFERENCE Not Transported 
2:59:48 PM lcounsel [Fuisting/Dunn present, pltiff not present 
3:00:14 PM JJudge !addresses counsel 
3:00:26 PM jstate !addresses court on filings on due dates for responses, Mr. Fuisting will 
!Attorney i ask for a stay on pc 
3:01:15 PM {Judge [reviews files 
3:01 :29 PM !Defense !have not file an amended, but asking stay, mtn on the psi, asking stay 
!Attorney !to file an amended, asking for transcripts, other matter he was sent 
! !12/24/14 can file a Rule 35 motion, ask the court to appoint counsel 
I ion criminal 
3:02:49 PM !Judge !inquire on pd 
3:02:55 PM Jstate f no obj to appt 
!Attorney 1 
.... 3: 03:04 .. PM J Judge ............ J inquires __ appl .. on .. indi ~",...t'l' ..... 1 .......................................................................................................................................  
3:03:17 PM (Defense /addresses court 
!Attorney l ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ' .................................... . 
3:03:23 PM jJudge jwill grant, but he needs to file an affidavit of, t" 01 ~tf\tu 
................................................ .;. .................................... ;. .................................................................................................................................................................. :1 ............. ~l ............................................... . 
3:04:06 PM !Judge iwill take count the motion and affidavit for partial payment 
I : 
3:04:20 PM }Judge fwill find tl\.d,1t+'\-'t to appoint counsel on the underlying criminal case 
t ialso 
3:04:56 PM 1state f no obj to stay, but obj to amended petition 
!Attorney l 
................................................ , ..................................... 0, ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
3:05:09 PM !Judge jinquies/ 
......................................................... a.,.,, ....................... ;. ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
3:05:23 PM \Defense \response 
\Attorney ! 
3:05:38 PM lJudge [will stay on the cv-pc- case, set for status 
3:06:24 PM lJudge !inquires on transcripts 
3:06:30 PM !Defense !comments 
!Attorney ! 
3:06:35 PM JJudge [Review date 5/27@3 pm another review. 
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Attorneys for Defendant MAY 2 6 "!s"',r-'-·-- .J 
LANCE FUISTING ISB#7791 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7 409 
CHRIGTOPHER o. 
By HALEY I\PY~:1\;; 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
CONDUCT DEPOSITION OF COUNSEL, 
BRIAN NEVILLE AND BRIAN BLENDER 
COMES NOW, JIMMY D LEYTHAM, the above-named Petitioner, by and 
through counsel, LANCE FUISTING, of the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and 
moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b), for permission to conduct a 
deposition of counsel, Mr. Brian Neville and Mr. Brian Blender. In the original Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and accompanying First Affidavit of Petitioner, Petitioner alleges 
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which require further investigation 
outside the record. In order to protect Petitioners' rights to the effective assistance of 
counsel and to a full and fair hearing on his claims, this Court should permit him to 
conduct a deposition of Mr. Neville and Mr. Blender. 
A petitioner may employ any method of discovery available under the civil rules, 
including depositions. I.R.C.P. 26(a). Depositions may extend beyond those conducted 
of trial counsel and their team, including other important witnesses to the petitioner's 
claims, such as key law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 
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• 
299, 302 (2000) (noting post-conviction depositions taken of trial counsel and police 
officer regarding alleged Miranda violation). A transcript from the deposition will be 
attached to Mr. Leytham's Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-4903 ("Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall 
be attached to the application ... "). After reviewing the deposition, this Court will be in 
an informed position to decide whether Mr. Leytham's claims should proceed to an 
evidentiary hearing or be summarily dismissed. I.C. § 19-4906(c) (authorizing summary 
disposition "when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits" that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact). 
A deposition is necessary to provide additional evidentiary support for Mr. 
Leytham's claims. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Leytham 
must show both that his counsels' performance was deficient and that such deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). To prove deficient performance, Mr. Leytham "must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. To do so, 
Mr. Leytham must "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for 
an objective evaluation of counsel's performance at that time. Id. at 689. Mr. Leytham 
"must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id. Accordingly, a deposition should be 
granted to afford Mr. Leytham a full and fair opportunity to meet his burden of proof. A 
complete understanding of the scope of the investigation and preparation of trial 
counsel is necessary to assess trial counsel's performance. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003)(when assessing trial counsel's choices, courts should first 
focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-
91 ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."). 
A deposition is the only pre-evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly 
developing Petitioner's claims. Unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions 
provide both parties a full opportunity to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
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challenged conduct. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York: 
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other party 
is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and can 
frame the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions. 
Moreover, the party being examined does not have the opportunity to 
study the questions in advance and to consult with counsel before 
answering, as is the case if interrogatories are used. Attempts at evasion, 
which might be stymied by a persistent oral examination, cannot easily be 
countered by interrogatories. The flexibility and the potency of oral 
depositions is in large part lacking in written interrogatories. 
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted); 
see also Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that it is 
proper under most circumstances to disregard an affidavit when the affidavit is 
contradicted by the witness's prior deposition testimony). 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether a trial court's refusal to 
permit a post-conviction deposition of trial counsels' investigator constituted an abuse of 
discretion. Hall, 151 Idaho at 52. The Court did not set forth specific criteria for 
analyzing the propriety of deposing a defense investigator but instead relied upon the 
three-pronged abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the district court 
properly denied the deposition of the investigator. Id. at 51. The Court noted the 
investigator was cooperative with post-conviction counsel (although he would not sign 
an affidavit), and post-conviction counsel were able to depose trial counsel, thus 
providing petitioner with a means of obtaining evidence to support his claim that counsel 
were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of an alternate 
perpetrator. Id. at 52. The Court also observed that trial counsels' depositions were the 
most direct and material evidence of the investigation into the alternate perpetrator they 
had authorized, the results of that investigation, and how that information was used. Id. 
All of Mr. Leytham's claims require further investigation in order to determine what 
factual basis exists for them. Mr. Leytham's present counsel needs to ask questions 
related to his claims of ineffectiv~ assistance in order to provide the required evidence 
to earn an evidentiary hearing on such claims. Post-Conviction counsel seeks to inquire 
of Mr. Neville and Mr. Blender as follows: 
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I. Claim One: Mr. Leytham claims that Mr. Neville failed to conduct a proper pre-
trial investigation. Post-Conviction counsel intends to inquire of Mr. Neville 
regarding his investigation of issues related to Mr. Leytham's case. 
II. Claim Two: Mr. Reed claims that Mr. Neville (and Mr. Blender, who covered the 
Change of Plea hearing) failed to investigate and discuss strategy prior to the 
entry of a guilty plea. Post-Conviction counsel intends to inquire of both Mr. 
Neville and Mr. Blender about the facts surrounding the guilty plea and 
whether there were deficiencies in the representation. 
Ill. Claim Three: Mr. Reed claims that Mr. Neville failed to communicate effectively 
with him. Post-Conviction Counsel intends to inquire of Mr. Neville about the 
extent and nature of communications he had with Mr. Leytham. 
DATED this 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Zc- day of May 2015, I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Shawna Dunn 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
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I 
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3:19:52PM ! !Present: Lance Fuisting for petitioner, Shawna Dunn for respondent 
. i ! 
i : ............................................. + ...................... _ ... _ ......... _ ............................... _ ......... ·········-·············"··"·····"·· ...................... --··-·-··-···-···-··-··--···--··-·----.. ·· 
3:20:08 PM iCourt !Petitioner has filed a motion for permission to conduct deposition of 
! itrial counsel. ............... , ... -.......................... ..;. ......................... -....................................................................................................................................... - ................... -............. _,, ....... _. _________ ................ -... .. 
3:20:57 PM !Fuisting !That motion was only just filed yesterday. Updates Court on case 
! !status since last hearing. Ask that the motion be set for hearing. 
' : -................................................ L .............. _ ....................... J ............................................................................................................................ .._ ... - ........ _____ ................. -........ _ .. __ ....................... ___ _ 
3:23:08 PM jDunn WH be filing my Response today or tomorrow. 
3:23:39 PM !Court !6/17/15 @4pm for hearing on the motion . 
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No. 5287 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
OBJECTION TO DEPOSITIONS 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and object to the petitioner's request to hold 
depositions in this case. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The Supreme Court recently spoke to the issue of post-conviction discovery, saying: 
A district court has discretion to grant discovery in post-conviction proceedings. 
I.C.R. 57(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45, 253 P.3d 716, 719 (2011). However, 
discovery is required when a petitioner demonstrates it is necessary to protect his 
substantial rights. Hall, 151 Idaho at 45, 253 P.3d at 719. The petitioner "must 
identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why discovery 
as to those matters is necessary to his or her application." Id. (quoting State v. 
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LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003)). While 
reasonable discovery may be permitted, the district court should not allow the 
petitioner to engage in a "[f]ishing expedition." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 
139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006). "The UPCPA provides a forum for known 
grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances." Id. 
State v. Abdullah, 2015 Ida. LEXIS 78, *244-245 (Idaho Mar. 2, 2015). 
ANALYSIS 
As explained in the Abdullah decision, for discovery to be required, the petitioner must 
show that it is necessary to protect substantial rights. Id. The State submits that the petitioner 
cannot make such a showing. The presentence report along with transcripts of the plea hearing and 
sentencing hearing defeat the petitioner arguments without the need for depositions or an 
evidentiary hearing 
First, the petitioner claims that the deposition would include inquiry into whether Mr. 
Neville conducted proper pretrial investigation. There is no specificity to the allegation that more 
investigation should have been done. The petitioner has not alleged what such investigation would 
have revealed or why that revelation would have been helpful in the case. The plea hearing 
transcript clearly reflects that this area was the subject of close scrutiny by the Court. Specifically, 
the Court inquired, 
Q: Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney 
provided [sic] during discovery? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: ls there anything that your attorney has -that you've asked your attorney 
to do that he has not done? 
A: No, ma' am. 
Q: And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these 
crimes? 
A: Yes, ma'am 
Q: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime? 
OBJECTION TO DEPOSITIONS (LEYTHAM) Page 2 2 
000051
A:No,ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14.) 
This passage, along with the rest of the record, reflects that additional inquiry by defense 
counsel would have been to no avail. Mr. Leytham agreed he had seen the discovery. Mr. Leytham 
admitted, during his entry of plea, there was nothing he had asked of counsel that had not been done 
and further admitted there were no witnesses who could demonstrate his innocence. (Tr., pg. 24, 
ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14.). More importantly, he also admitted the he had committed the crimes of 
Forgery and Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card and entered guilty pleas to the 
same. (Tr., pg. 30, ln.11 to pg. 32, ln. 6.) The State's discovery is in the presentence report and is 
lengthy. Additionally, the purse theft was on video, which was provided to Mr. Leytham and his 
attorney in discovery. (Tr., pg. 42, ln.17 - pg. 43, ln.2.) Similarly, there were still photos of Mr. 
Leytham as he ttied to access cash with the victim's card. (Tr., pg. 58, ln.22 to pg. 59, ln. 1) Given 
all of the above, there has not been a sufficient showing that a deposition in this area would even be 
productive, let alone necessary. 
Next, the petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in regard to advising him to enter a 
guilty plea. Counsel Insofar as the evidence against Mr. Leytham was significant on each count, it 
was not ineffective to advise the petitioner to enter a plea pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. 
Advising a client to enter a guilty plea is a tactical decision. The petitioner has not shown counsel's 
choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any shortcomings in counsel's 
knowledge or preparation." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993) 
Further the petitioner has not forwarded any reason to believe depositions would reveal helpful 
information in this area. 
Specifically, the petitioner alleges that counsel failed to adequately advise him of trial 
strategy. Where the petitioner entered a guilty plea prior to trial, the State cannot perceive how 
failing to advise of trial strategy could be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr Leytham 
was guilty as charged and admitted the conduct short of trial. Counsel made a tactical decision to 
pursue a negotiated plea, based on a thorough understanding of the facts and after consultation with 
his client. / 
The petitioner further claims that he was assured he would get probation. This is belied by 
the record. The petitioner was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State was 
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free to argue for imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.) To 
which the State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 15.) The Court went to clarify that the 
plea was not binding. The following exchange then occurred: 
Q:What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence 
in the forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction 
card case and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19years 
without the possibility of parole. Do you understand that? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do 
you understand that? 
A: Yes ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 23, Ins. 3-14.) 
Further even if counsel had not made this clear, the State submits that such a failure could be 
corrected on the record. Recent appellate court cases in this regard are significant: Murray v. State, 
156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014) and Grant v. State,_ Idaho_, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 
2014). These cases, together, indicate that ineffective assistance of counsel, in the form of 
inadequate information prior to a guilty plea, can be cured when the criminal defendant is fully 
advised by the Court. Here, Mr. Leytham's exchange with the Court cures any argument that he 
was not fully advised by counsel. Moreover, when asked by the Court he indicates that he does 
understand the limitations of the deal - which demonstrates that he had already been informed by 
counsel. 
Finally, the petitioner claims that there was a breakdown of attorney-client. 
communications. The Ninth Circuit has said that, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel who is free of conflicts of interest. It also has held 
that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to an appointed lawyer with whom he has a 
'meaningful relationship' so long as the lawyer acts as the client's advocate." Plumlee v. Masto, 
512 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed the same issue, saying: 
Obviously, the word "conflict" is also used in common parlance to describe 
a personality conflict, an artistic conflict, a family conflict and many others 
sorts of antagonism - even war. In this context, however, as the Supreme 
Court cases make clear, we are talking about legal conflicts of interest - an 
incompatibility between the interests of the two of a lawyer's clients, or 
between the lawyer's own private interest and those of his client. 
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Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008) No actual conflict of interest existed in this 
case and the "quality" of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of 
meriting a remedy or further inquiry. At this point, he has, at most, claimed that Mr. Neville had a 
positive social relationship with the trial Judge. 1 Even if true, this would have been to the 
petitioner's benefit. Accordingly, further inquiry in this area is not merited. Counsel continued to 
serve Mr. Leytham's interests and argued on his behalf at sentencing. There has been no showing 
that further inquiry is necessary to protect Mr. Leytham's substantial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State moves that the Court deny the motion for depositions. 
Further, if the Court is not inclined to grant the State's motion, the State seeks oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i)j_ day of May, 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecutor 
~S)AJuvr-
ShawnaDunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
1 The State does not concede the accuracy of this point, but will treat it as true merely for the 
purposes or our briefing. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..zi_ day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Depositions was served to: in the manner noted below: 
Jimmy D. Leytham, IDOC No. 16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO Box 14, Boise, Idaho 83707 
CJ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first 
class. 
CJ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
CJ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~~v 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
DISCOVERY 
On February 25, 2015, Jimmy Leytham, filed a Petition pro se1 and requested the Court 
appoint counsel. The Court granted his request that same date. The Court held a status conference, 
and at the petitioner's request, continued the status conference to allow him to file a Rule 35. At 
the continued hearing, his counsel requested more time and the Court rescheduled the status 
conference again to June 17, 2015. 
Leytham moved for discovery, more specifically allowing him to take depositions of his 
trial counsel. 
Based on the following, the Court denies his motion. 
ANALYSIS 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to proceedings on an application for 
post-conviction relief, the discovery provisions contained in those rules are not applicable unless 
specifically ordered by the court. I.C.R. 57(b); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 
1071 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,402,973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 
1999)). I.C.R. 57(b) provides as follows: 
1 "Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty. v. 
Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d I 043, I 046 (2003). Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration 
simply because they are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v. 
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 
(1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, I 12 
Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385,388 n.5 (1987). 
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(b) Filing and Processing. The petition for post-conviction relief shall be 
filed by the clerk of the court as a separate civil case and be processed under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure except as otherwise ordered by the trial court; 
provided the provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
not apply to the proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court. 
I.C.R. 57(b) (emphasis added). 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put to the sound discretion 
of the district court. Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402, 973 P.2d at 754. Unless necessary to protect 
Leytham's substantial rights, the Court is not required to order discovery. Id. In order to be granted 
discovery, a post-conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is 
requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his application. See Id. at 402-03, 
973 P.2d at 754-55. In this request, Leytham is really engaging in nothing but a fishing expedition. 
While he cites to Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 52,253 P.3d 716, 726 (2011), that was a capital case 
and does not really apply. In addition, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court's exercise of 
discretion in denying some additional depositions of investigaotrs. 
In this Petition, he contends as follows: 
• His attorneys were ineffective for: 
o Failing to investigate 
o Failing to effectively communicate 
These are routine matters. Other than cursory claims that he wants to inquire regarding 
investigation of his issues, the Court finds Leytham made no showing why the discovery he 
requests is necessary to his application. Leytham's claims are abstract. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 
Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001). Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court denies 
motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 6th day of June 2015. 
CheriC~Di~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned authority hereby certifies that on June 3 , 2015, I mailed (served) a true 
and correct copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) 1.C.R. to 
each of the parties below as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
SHAWNA DUNN 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
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Time Speaker Note 
4:08:56 PM ! !JIMMY LEYTHAM CV PC 15 02841 STATUS 
4:09:01 PM f f Present Lance Fusiting for petitioner, Shawna Dunn for respondent 
4:09:22 PM 1Dunn 1we can lift the stay now. 
4:09:30 PM JFuisting Jrhat's correct. And I'd ask for two weeks from today to file a final 
! !Amended Petition. 
4:09:48 PM fcourt fAsk State to provide the order lifting stay. Amended Petition,hor 
1 /notice of not filing one, due by 7/2; State's response by 8/2/15. 
1 !Doesn't sound like we'll need an evidentiary hearing. 
~ ~ 
4:10:49 PM JFuisting Jrn be seeking one. 
4:10:56 PM fcourt f rve looked at the claims and they're fairly straight forward. 
4:12:18 PM 1court 1You have until 8/24/15 to file an opposition; if none is filed, then I'll 
! ltake the matter under advisement. 
4:13:18 PM l · JEnd of case 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
LANCE L. FOISTING, ISB #7791 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
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JUN 3 0 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TENllLE GRANT 
D'.:':PlJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841 
SECOND AND FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
JIMMY LEYTHAM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION 
STATE OF IDAHO, RELIEF 
Respondent. 
I, Jimmy D. Leytham, after first being duly sworn (affirmed), do hereby attest to the 
following: 
1) I am over the age of eighteen years. 
2) I was the Defendant in CR-FE-2014-3478 and CR-FE-2014-5259. 
3) I retained Brian Neville as my attorney in those cases. 
4) On the day I plead guilty, September 10, 2014, Brian Blender, who works 
with Mr. Neville, appeared to represent me. 
5) I did not know Mr. Blender would be appearing prior to September 10, 
2014. 
6) I only had a 7 to 10 minute discussion with Mr. Blender prior to pleading 
guilty on September 10, 2014. 
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7) Mr. Blender and I did not discuss restitution on September 10, 2014. 
8) I was taking numerous medications at the time of my change of plea. 
9) I believe the medications I was taking on September 10, 2014, impacted 
my ability to understand the proceedings. 
10) I initially informed the Court that the drugs I was on made me more 
susceptible to suggestions from Mr. Blender during my change of plea on 
September 10, 2014. 
11) I did not fill out the entire written guilty plea myself. 
12) I told Mr. Neville about my medical conditions. 
13) Mr. Neville did not attempt to obtain my medical records. 
14) There was no proof of my medical conditions to supply to the Court at the 
time of my sentencing. 
15) Neither Mr. Neville or Mr. Blender explained to me that I had a right not 
to participate in the presentence investigation process. 
16) There was no discussion of the restitution amount during my change of 
plea hearing. 
17) At sentencing, my attorney agreed to $55,331.92 in restitution for 
uncharged conduct on my behalf. I was never asked if I agreed to that 
amount. 
18) I believed the restitution was $202.75. That was the amount in the 
presentence report. 
19) My attorney did not show me the presentence report until the day of 
sentencing. 
20) My attorney only showed me Dr. Arnold's evaluation on the day of 
sentencing. 
21) I was unable to read the presentence report and evaluation myself because 
of a medical condition. 
22) I do not believe my attorney read me Dr. Arnold's evaluation in its 
entirety. 
23) I do not believe my attorney thoroughly reviewed the presentence report 
and evaluations with me. 
24) My attorney only read the recommendations section of the presentence 
report to me. 
25) I was advised not to say anything when I had my opportunity to address 
the Court at sentencing. 
26) Neither Mr. Neville nor Mr. Blender spoke to me about my right to appeal 
my sentence. 
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27) No appeal of my sentence was filed. 
28) Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED, this 30 day of June 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN (AFFIRMED) to before me, a Notary Public, in and for 
the state of Idaho, county of Ada, this Jo;'}µay of _l~~-1)~-C....~------ 20 -15_. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 'A,p(,//f. Co1.viH 
My Commission Expires <j /JD/{; , 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this t:-0 day of June 2015, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Shawna Dunn 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
ISB No. 5287 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1c 
By BETH MASTERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
ORDER LIFTING STAY OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
The above matter coming before the Court on the 17th day of June 2015, the Petitioner 
being before the Court represented by counsel, the Court having considered arguments of counsel 
and being otherwise advised in the matter; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS COURT DOES ORDER that Order Granting 
Stay of Proceedings is lifted. The Petitioner is to file any amended petition on or before July 2, 
2015. 
~ 
DATED this.!_ day of July, 2015. 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 5287 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 
Case No. CV PC 2015 02841 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and does hereby Answer Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in 
the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by the Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically admitted 
herein. 
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SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Answering paragraphs 1 and 2 of Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
filed February 25, 2015 as CV PC 2015 02841, Respondent admits the allegations contained 
therein. 
2. Answering paragraph 3, the Respondent admits in part and denies in part. The 
Petitioner was sentenced on case CR-FE-2014-0003478 as the Petitioner alleges. However, the 
Petitioner was also sentenced in CR-FE-2014-0005269 
3. Answering paragraph 4, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein. 
4. Answering paragraph 5, the Respondent admits in part and denies in part. As 
alleged in paragraph 5, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to Count II. However it was Counts I 
and III that were dismissed, not I and II as the Petitioner alleges. 
5. Answering paragraph 6, the Respondent has insufficient information to either 
admit or deny that a timely appeal was filed because the Ada County Prosecutor's Office does 
not generally handle appellate matters for the State. However, the State would note that the only 
appeal on the register of actions currently is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35. If there was 
a timely appeal, from the judgement of conviction it is not recorded on the register of actions 
reviewed by the Respondent. 
6. Answering paragraphs 7 and 8 regarding, the Petitioner's statement of his requests 
these are not factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied. 
7. Answering paragraph 9, the Respondent denies that representation by counsel in this 
case was ineffective and further denies that any prejudice attached from any alleged 
ineffectiveness. 
5. Answering paragraph 10 and 11 are not factual allegations capable of being 
admitted or denied 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho 
Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are 
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-4901(b). 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitoner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That the Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That the Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
c) for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
~ 
DATED this;)] day of July 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
~~ 
By: Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisdQday of July 2015, I caused to be served, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief upon the individuals 
named below in the manner noted: 
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St. Room 1107, 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
rp( By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the office 
of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney( s) at the facsimile number: __ _ 
~ 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. CV PC 2015 02841 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and does hereby moves for summary dismissal of the Petitioner's Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906( c) on the general basis that, in light of the 
pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition fails 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The post-conviction relief process initiates a civil proceeding where, like all civil actions, 
the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Murray v. State, 
121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992); I.C. §19-4907. However, unlike 
ordinary civil actions, an application for post-conviction relief: 
must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that 
would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for 
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post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting 
its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting 
evidence is not included with the application. I. C. § 19-4903. In other words, the 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. 
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437-38, 163 P.3d 222, 226-27 (Ct. App. 2007). If a petitioner 
cannot support allegations in his post-conviction petition with verified facts or admissible evidence, 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post 
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has 
raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, 
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, 
an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. ( citation omitted) 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 627 (Ct. App. 2002). Further, the Court 
of Appeals explained that: 
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly 
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not 
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the 
claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of 
law. Citations omitted. 
Keserovic v. State, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028-29 (Ct. App. 2015). The Idaho Supreme Court specified 
in State v. Lovelace that Courts "do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that 
are unsupported by admissible evidence." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61, 90 P.3d 278, 286 
(2003). 
II. ISSUES 
In the Petitioner's petition, he identifies three claims for relief based on allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court should dismiss the claims for post-conviction relief 
because the Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether his representation was ineffective. Evidence demonstrates that: 
1. Petitioner's counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate; 
2. Petitioner's counsel adequately advised him on all matters necessary to enter an informed 
guilty plea; 
3. The quality of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of 
meriting a remedy; 
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To the extent that additional facts raised in the Petitioner's Second Affidavit could be 
construed as additional claims for relief, those possible claims are without merit because: 
4. Petitioner was informed of his rights and responsibilities under the plea deal prior to entry 
of plea. 
5. None of the Petitioner's medications impaired his ability to enter an informed guilty plea. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Court should grant the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as the Petitioner has 
raised no genuine issues of material fact to support his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. To determine whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, Idaho uses 
the two-prong Strickland test. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014). 
Under Strickland, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel's representation was deficient and (2) 
that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant's case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To prove deficient representation, Petitioner must show that 
his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To 
demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner must how a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694, 
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984). Under the Strickland standard, 
counsel is "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. 
None of the Petitioners' explicit or implicit claims overcome the strong presumption that 
his counsel rendered adequate assistance. His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not 
supported by admissible evidence. Instead, his claims are undermined by the record and his 
written guilty plea. Because petitioner cannot make the requisite showing that he was prejudiced 
by any alleged deficiency in representation, this Court should summarily dismiss without an 
evidentiary hearing. 
1. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's First Claim because 
Petitioner's counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate. 
There is no merit to the Petitioner's first claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, where 
he asserts that his attorney failed to conduct investigation as required by the Sixth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court describes defense counsel's Sixth Amendment duty to 
investigate as "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
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makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 .The duty to 
investigate is not boundless, but is limited in scope. Id at 680-81, 104 S. Ct. at 2061. When 
evaluating whether assistance of counsel was effective, "a particular decision not to 
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. 
Considering the circumstances, including the strength of the State's cases, the record 
reveals that additional investigation by defense counsel would have been to no avail 1• The Court 
explored the adequacy of the investigation during the plea hearing, inquiring, 
Q: Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney provided 
[sic] during discovery? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: Is there anything that your attorney has - that you've asked your attorney to do 
that he has not done? 
A: No, ma'am. 
Q: And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these crimes? 
A: Yes, ma'am 
Q: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime? 
A: No, ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.8.) 
Petitioner agreed he had seen the discovery. Petitioner admitted, during his entry of plea 
there was nothing he had asked of counsel that had not been done and further admitted there 
were no witnesses who could demonstrate his innocence. (Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14). 
The purse theft was on video, which was provided to the Petitioner and his attorney in discovery. 
(Tr., pg. 42, ln.17 to pg. 43, ln.2). Similarly, there were still photos of the Petitioner as he tried 
to access cash with the victim's card. (Tr., pg. 58, ln.22 to pg. 59, ln. l ). Additionally, the State's 
discovery is lengthy, as demonstrated by the presentence report. The Petitioner's petition does 
not specifically allege what more investigation should have been done, what such investigation 
would have revealed, or how he was prejudiced by lack of investigation. Because petitioner has 
failed to show the requisite prejudice to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the claim. 
1 The State will discuss the facts of Mr. Leytham's cases together, however the Petitioner is technically only pursuing 
post conviction relief in case number CR-FE-2014-0003478. 
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2. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing petitioner's second claim 
because Petitioner's counsel adequately advised him on all matters necessary to enter 
an informed guilty plea. 
Because the Petitioner was appropriately advised before entry of plea, the Court should enter 
summary judgment dismissing the petitioner's second claim. Specifically, the Court should 
dismiss petitioner's claim that he was not advised on trial strategy and that he was promised 
probation because these allegations are without merit. 
Idaho Courts apply the Strickland test to determine whether a defendant received 
effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Murray, 156 Idaho at 164, 321 P.3d at 
714. When alleging ineffective counsel during the plea process, a Petitioner must demonstrate 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 
930 (2010). Put another way, demonstrating ineffective assistance during the plea process, 
requires a showing that a decision not to accept a plea agreement and plead guilty 
would have been rational under the circumstances. A bare assertion that one 
would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial is insufficient 
to prevent summary dismissal. See Ridgley, id. at 677, 227 P.3d at 931. Instead, a 
petitioner must link his claim of deficient performance to his decision to plead 
guilty and demonstrate why the deficiency caused the guilty plea. Id. 
Evans v. State, Docket No. Docket No. 40300, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 411, 2014 Ida. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 113, at *12 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014). 
Where the evidence against the Petitioner was significant on each count, it was not 
ineffective to advise the Petitioner to enter a plea under a negotiated plea agreement. By going to 
trial, the Petitioner would have risked a guilty verdict on three counts of Felony Forgery in CR-
FE-2014-0003478. In electing to go to trial in CR-FE-2014-0005269, the Petitioner would have 
risked convictions of a Felony Grand Theft and Felony Possession of a Financial Transaction 
Card. Additionally, the Petitioner could have been charged as a persistent offender. By 
negotiating a deal where Petitioner pleaded guilty to only two felonies, counsel ensured that his 
client would not be convicted of three additional felony charges or treated as a persistent 
offender at sentencing. The Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. Consequently, the Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the claim. 
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The Court should dismiss Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim under summary 
judgment because petitioner failed to demonstrate why any deficiency in counsel's advice caused 
him to plead guilty. Petitioner makes the bare assertion that counsel failed to adequately advise 
him of trial strategy, such lack of advice is not prejudicial. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 
294, 296-97, 870 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Ct. App. 1994) (summary dismissal of ineffective counsel claim 
appropriate where petitioner alleged attorney had not informed petitioner about the trial process 
but did not also articulate any prejudicial effect from this lack of information). Here, Petitioner 
has not articulated what prejudicial impact resulted from ignorance of trial strategy, and has not 
met his burden of showing "that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. Because the 
Petitioner's allegations do not entitle him to relief as a matter of law, his claim must be 
dismissed. 
Furthermore, the Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's 
second claim because the record shows that the Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that the Court 
was not bound by counsel's sentencing recommendations. Petitioner claims he pleaded guilty 
because counsel assured Petitioner he would receive probation; however, the record 
demonstrates that Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that probation was not guaranteed. The 
Petitioner was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State could argue for 
imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, lns. 13-15.) To which the 
State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, ln. 15.) The Court went to clarify that the plea 
was not binding. The following exchange occurred: 
Q: What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in the 
forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card case 
and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the 
possibility of parole. Do you understand that? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you 
understand that? 
A: Yes ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 23, lns. 3-14). Clearly Petitioner knew that it was not a binding plea agreement and that 
there was the possibility of a prison sentence. 
Even if counsel had not clarified that the plea was non-binding, the State submits that 
such a failure could be corrected on the record. Recent appellate court cases are significant: 
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Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 and Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. 
App. 2014). These cases together indicate that ineffective assistance of counsel, in inadequate 
information prior to a guilty plea, can be cured when the criminal defendant is fully advised by 
the Court. Here, Petitioner's exchange with the Court cures any argument that he was not fully 
advised by counsel. Moreover, when asked by the Court he indicates that he does understand the 
limitations of the deal - which demonstrates that he had already been informed by counsel. 
Furthermore, when the petitioner described the plea agreement on his written guilty plea, 
petitioner mentioned no promise of probation. (Guilty Plea, pg. 3 § 9). 
Consequently, the Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
guilty plea was attributable to his counsel's defective performance, or that such performance was 
prejudicial. This Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the petitioner's second claim. 
3. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing petitioner's third claim because 
the quality of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of 
meriting a remedy. 
The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's third claim 
because the quality of attorney-client communications here does not warrant post-conviction 
relief. The Petitioner claims there was a breakdown of attorney-client communications. 
However, poor communication between lawyer and client, or "a lack of [communication], 
without allegations of prejudice, is not enough to sustain an ineffective assistance claim." Jones, 
125 Idaho at 297, 870 P.2d at 4. 
Here, Petitioner has not shown that any attorney-client communication issues produced a 
prejudicial result. In his First Affidavit, Petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to return phone 
calls and failed to call petitioner to confirm that a court date had not been rescheduled. While 
failing to return a phone call, if true, could be an irritation, such behavior renders no attorney's 
performance ineffective. Petitioner also alleged that Mr. Neville did not show up for the plea 
hearing on September 10, 2014. However, petitioner concedes that Mr. Blender, another attorney 
from the same firm represented Petitioner at the hearing. Petitioner also alleges in his Second 
Affidavit that he spoke to Mr. Blender for a limited time prior to pleading guilty on September 
10, 2014. However, when asked by the Court, the Petitioner agreed that he had enough time to 
speak to his attorney and had told the attorney everything he knew about the crimes. (Tr., pg.24, 
ln. 25 to pg. 25, ln.5). As Petitioner is only entitled to relief if he can show alleged errors 
produced a prejudicial result, petitioner's claim should be dismissed. 
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While an attorney's conflict of interest may warrant post-conviction remedy, no such 
conflict of interest occurred in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that "until a 
defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established 
the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 61, 90 
P.3d at 286. The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed the issue, saying: 
Obviously, the word "conflict" is also used in common parlance to describe a 
personality conflict, an artistic conflict, a family conflict and many others sorts of 
antagonism- even war. In this context, however, as the Supreme Court cases make 
clear, we are talking about legal conflicts of interest- an incompatibility between the 
interests of the two of a lawyer's clients, or between the lawyer's own private 
interest and those of his client. 
Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008). No actual conflict of interest existed in this 
case and the "quality" of Petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of 
meriting a remedy. Petitioner has claimed that Mr. Neville had a positive social relationship with 
the trial Judge.2 Even if true, this would have been to the petitioner's benefit. Counsel continued to 
serve the Petitioner's interests and argued on his behalf at sentencing. Therefore, the Petitioner's 
third claim should be dismissed pursuant to summary judgment. 
4. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing any possible claims implied in 
the petitioner's affidavits because petitioner was informed of his rights and 
responsibilities under the plea deal prior to entry of plea. 
To the extent that any additional claims are implied in the petitioner's Affidavits, these 
allegations do not entitle the Petitioner to post-conviction relief. Petitioner implies in his 
affidavits certain possible issues, namely that: (A) he was not told he had the right to refuse to 
participate in the presentence investigation; (B) he was not aware of the restitution his attorney 
had agreed to when petitioner plead guilty; (C) petitioner could not thoroughly review the 
presentence report with his counsel; (D) Petitioner was advised against speaking during 
sentencing; and (E) counsel was ineffective with respect to Petitioner's right to appeal. These 
claims should be summarily dismissed because Petitioner's allegations are disproven by the 
record of the criminal proceedings and his allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. 
A. Petitioner was informed by the Court he retained his right to silence, but that his plea 
deal depended on his participation in the presentence investigation. 
2 The State does not concede the accuracy of this point, but will treat it as true merely for the purposes of our briefing. 
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Although the Petitioner claims he was not informed of his right to refuse to participate in 
the presentence investigation, this is disproven by both the record and his written guilty plea. In 
his written plea, Petitioner acknowledged his right to silence and his right to refuse to participate 
in the presentence investigation. (Guilty Plea, pg. 1 § 2, pg. 6 § 32-33). Additionally, the plea 
hearing transcript reflects that this area was the subject of close scrutiny by the Court. 
Specifically, the Court inquired: 
THE COURT: Have you discussed with your client the fact that I'm going to 
order a presentence investigation report to be prepared. And in this case I'm also 
going to order a 19-2524 evaluation and that anything he says during those 
examinations may be used against him at sentencing? 
MR. BLENDER: Yes, your Honor. That is in the guilty plea form so we talked 
about that when he signed it. 
THE COURT: All right. And did you explain to him that he has a constitutional 
right to remain silent during that examination, but as part of the plea agreement, 
he agreed to waive that right? 
MR. BLENDER: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: And was that his decision and his decision only? 
MR. BLENDER: He said he understood it and he would engage with the process. 
THE COURT: And have you explained to him that if he doesn't engage in the 
process, the State will no longer be bound by its agreement? 
MR BLENDER: Yes. 
(Tr., pg. 14, ln. 25 to pg. 15, ln.23.) The Petitioner was informed that he retained the right to 
silence regarding answering questions that might increase his sentence, but that his plea deal 
depended on his participation in the presentence investigation. The record and written guilty plea 
form demonstrate that petitioner's claim is patently false. 
Even assuming arguendo the Petitioner was not adequately advised prior to the Court's 
comments, he would not merit relief. The Court can cure the absence of such information prior to 
the plea. See Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 and Grant, 156 Idaho at 605, 329 P.3d 380. 
Because Petitioner was aware of his right to silence and his right to refuse participation in the 
presentence investigation, the State moves to dismiss the petitioner's implied claim that counsel 
provided ineffective assistance at the time of his plea. 
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B. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel's performance was ineffective because 
petitioner was informed of his obligation to pay restitution when he pleaded guilty, 
and he did not object to the restitution amount at sentencing. 
The Petitioner's implied claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding restitution 
should be dismissed because his allegations do not present prima facie evidence of deficient 
performance. In his Second Affidavit, Petitioner implies that that his counsel's performance was 
deficient because he did not inform petitioner of the exact amount of restitution when he pleaded 
guilty. Even if true, this allegation would not rise to the level warranting a remedy, and therefore 
the claim should be dismissed under summary judgment. Further, this claim is clearly belied by 
the record. 
To avoid summary dismissal on a claim of an ineffective counsel regarding restitution, 
Petitioner must present prima facie evidence that his attorney failed to "either inform his client of 
the risk of a restitution order as a consequence of a contemplated guilty plea or to object to the 
State's request for restitution at or after sentencing when the defendant was not previously 
informed of that consequence." Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 93, 137 P.3d 475, 480 (Ct. App. 
2006). Here, petitioner cannot make such a showing. 
Restitution was explicitly a condition of the plea agreement, as described by the 
prosecutor prior to entry of plea. (Tr., pg. 4, Ins. 10-15.). The Court clarified that as part of the 
plea agreement the Petitioner agreed to pay be restitution on all of the dismissed charges, 
restitution on case DR-2014-41181, with such restitution being subject to a civil judgment. (Tr., 
pg. 4, ln.10 to pg. 6, ln. 23; pg. 8, Ins. 15-25). After describing the restitution which Petitioner 
was agreeing to pay by pleading guilty, the Court confirmed with defense counsel that the 
Court's understating was "an accurate reflection of the plea agreement." (Tr., pg. 8, Ins. 1-3). 
The Court specifically inquired whether the Petitioner himself understood that he was 
agreeing to pay restitution by pleading guilty. Exploring the adequacy of Petitioner's 
understanding of his restitution obligations, the Court asked: 
Q. Now you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these cases 
including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case, 
2014-411861. Do you understand that? 
A. And which one would that be, ma'am? 
Q. That's the one that- it's the one that they're not going to file on. 




(Tr., pg. 23, ln.15 to pg. 24, ln.l). The Court closely scrutinized the petitioner's understanding of 
his restitution obligations under the plea agreement, later examining into the sufficiency of his 
written guilty plea. The Court inquired: 
Q. And do you understand again about the requirement that you're going to have 
to pay restitution to your victims? 
A. Yes ma'am. 
Q. And I noticed that you crossed yes and then it looks like over no it says -- you 
wrote L -- it looks like a signature but I'm not positive. It looks like an initial. But 
do you understand that you have to pay restitution to the victims? 
A. Yes, ma' am. 
(Tr., pg. 27, Ins. 7-17). The Petitioner's responses demonstrate that he clearly understood that he 
was obligated to pay restitution, and that he was aware of the amount of restitution. He 
acknowledged this responsibility multiple times directly to the Court and through his attorney. 
Petitioner had access to discovery documents that indicated restitution would be significant in his 
cases. Restitution ultimately amounted to $55,331.92 and $202.75 in Petitioner's cases. (Tr., pg. 
36, ln.20 to pg. 37, ln. 7). As to the higher figure, that exact figure, $55,331.92 was in police 
reports, DR 411861, which were provided to the petitioner prior to the plea. (Tr., pg. 4, lns.3-
17.)3 The Petitioner had reviewed the discovery prior to the plea. (Tr. Pg. 24, Ins. 17-20.) Thus, 
the record reflects that the petitioner knew the figure prior to entry of plea. 
Neither the Petitioner nor his attorney objected to the amount of restitution requested at 
sentencing. After the prosecutor identified the precise restitution figures, the Court confirmed 
with defense counsel that the restitution figures were appropriate. The Court asked: 
THE COURT: Is that -- is the amount of restitution, is that something he's going 
to be agreeing to? 
MR. NEVILLE: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you believe there's a sufficient basis to impose those 
amounts? 
MR. NEVILLE: I do. 
(Tr., pg. 36, Ins. 8-14). Not only did counsel acknowledge that petitioner agreed to pay that 
specific amount, counsel also conceded there was a sufficient basis to impose the restitution. The 
3 Those same reports were also in the PSI. (See final page of Brad Thome's Supplemental Report, as attached to the 
PSI.) 
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Court only ordered restitution after confirming with defense counsel that restitution figures were 
appropriate. 
The Court should dismiss the Petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel considering that 
the Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that he had to pay restitution under the plea deal, at a time 
that he had the reports which designated the exact amount later ordered, and because the 
Petitioner did not object to the amount of restitution at sentencing. He has not made a prima facie 
showing that counsel ineffectively advised him about restitution obligations under the plea deal. 
C. Because petitioner was able to review the presentence report with his attorney, any 
implied claim of ineffective counsel should be dismissed. 
Although petitioner claims he did not believe his counsel reviewed his presentence 
reports or evaluations thoroughly with him, such an allegation does not entitle the petitioner to 
relief. For example, the petitioner in Jones could not overcome summary judgment dismissal of 
an ineffective assistance claim when he alleged that was prevented from reviewing the 
presentence report. Jones, 125 Idaho at 296-97, 870 P.2d at 3-4. Although the report was 
discussed extensively during sentencing, the petitioner did not object to either his inability to 
review the report or to the contents of the report. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned: 
Even assuming the facts alleged in Jones' affidavits are true, Jones has failed to 
allege any errors or corrections he would have made at sentencing. Because he 
has failed to indicate what errors were contained in the presentence report that 
resulted in prejudice, Jones is not entitled to relief. Therefore, the state, as a 
matter of law, is entitled to summary judgment. The district court did not err in 
summarily dismissing the application for post-conviction relief on these grounds. 
Id. 
Here, like in Jones, the State is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The 
record directly contradicts defendant's claim that he was unable to review the report. The 
petitioner was asked this precise question by the Court and answered in the affirmative: 
And with regard to the presentence materials, have both parties had a full 
opportunity and sufficient time to examine those presentence materials? ... Mr. 
Leytham, have you read those materials?" 
The petitioner responded, "Yes, ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 36, ln.22 -pg. 37, ln.5.) . 
The record indicates that defense counsel was provided the 19-2522 report by the State 
and read the report to the Petitioner when he could not read it himself. (Tr., pg. 37, ln.19- pg. 38, 
ln. 7). When asked by the Court if there were any errors in the presentence report, defense 
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corrected minor clerical errors. (Tr., pg. 39, ln. 5- pg. 39, ln.10.) Mr. Neville's correction of the 
record regarding Petitioner's foot surgery was not substantively significant. However it indicates 
the Petitioner and his attorney had reviewed and discussed the report. Neither Petitioner nor his 
counsel objected to anything in the presentence report when it was discussed by the prosecutor 
and Court at sentencing. Most importantly, the Petitioner identified no errors in the presentence 
report that would have caused prejudice. Consequently, the Court should enter summary 
judgment dismissing the claim. 
D. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner not 
to speak at sentencing. 
Advising a client not to speak during sentencing is a tactical decision. The Petitioner has 
not shown counsel's choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any 
shortcomings in counsel's knowledge or preparation." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 
P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993). Petitioner has not articulated how such choice of tactics 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, or how such advice prejudiced petitioner. 
Therefore, any implied claim that that counsel was ineffective in advising petitioner not to speak 
at sentencing should be summarily dismissed. 
E. Petitioner cannot prove counsel was ineffective respective to his right to appeal. 
The Petitioner cannot meet his burden demonstrating that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file an appeal. Where a Petitioner has instructed 
counsel to file an appeal, but counsel did not do as directed, there may be a successful post-
conviction claim. See Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 76, 294 P.3d 197, 202 (Ct. App. 2012). 
However, that is not the case here. The Petitioner does not allege that he requested an appeal be 
filed. Instead, he merely alleges that his counsel did not speak to him about his right to appeal. 
(Second Affidavit, pg. 2 paragraph 26.) 
Where, as here, the Petitioner did not request an appeal, the review is more strict. The 
United States Supreme Court held "that counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult 
with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either ( 1) that a rational 
defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are non-frivolous grounds for 
appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was 
interested in appealing." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2000). 
So, counsel had a duty to consult IF there were non-frivolous grounds for an appeal or if the 
petitioner demonstrated a desire to appeal. 
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Once the duty to consult is established and counsel is shown to have been lacking in this 
regard, there still must be a showing of prejudice: 
Once counsel's performance has been shown to be deficient, the defendant must 
demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him or her about an appeal, 
the defendant would have timely appealed. In ascertaining whether a defendant 
has made the requisite showing of prejudice, courts may consider whether there is 
evidence of nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or the defendant in question 
promptly expressed a desire to appeal. Citations omitted 
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 273-74, 61 P.3d at 630-31. . 
Even assuming arguendo that it were true that counsel had failed to consult with 
Petitioner about his appeal rights, Petitioner's allegations do not merit a remedy. Notably, the 
Petitioner knew of his rights to appeal, as the Court explicitly advised the Petitioner of his appeal 
rights at sentencing. (Tr., pg. 64, lns.14-20). Although the record shows petitioner knew of his 
appeal rights, Petitioner never alleges that he directed his attorney to appeal or that he even 
wanted an appeal. Petitioner does not identify what the non-frivolous grounds for appeal would 
have been. Consequently, Petitioner has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by his 
attorney's alleged failure to consult regarding appeal rights. Because Petitioner has not identified 
how he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim should be summarily 
dismissed. 
Furthermore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel knew or should have known that 
a rational defendant in their client's position would have wanted to appeal. In determining 
whether a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal, "courts must take into account all the 
information counsel knew or should have known." State v. Goodwin, 138 Idaho 269, 273, 61 
P.3d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2002). For example, summary dismissal of an ineffective counsel claim 
was proper in Goodwin because petitioner has not shown that a rational defendant in his position 
would want to appeal the denial of his or her Rule 35 motion State v. Goodwin, 138 Idaho 269, 
273, 61 P.3d 626 630 (Ct. App. 2002). The Court examined the information that counsel knew 
or should have known, which included the facts that: 
(1) Goodwin pled guilty to burglary, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than ten years pursuant to I.C. § 18-1403; (2) Goodwin's 
sentence was within the statutory sentencing range; (3) Goodwin's offense 
involved the taking of more than $ 238,000 worth of coins from a residence; ( 4) 
by pleading guilty Goodwin indicated a desire to end judicial proceedings; (5) 
Goodwin did not appeal from his judgment of conviction or sentence; (6) in 
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his Rule 35 motion, Goodwin did not challenge the legality or excessiveness of 
his sentence, or submit any additional evidence in support of his motion, but 
merely requested that the district court reconsider the sentence imposed; (7) 
Goodwin's presentence investigation report indicated that he had a significant 
criminal record, with numerous felonies involving stolen property; (8) the 
presentence investigator recommended imprisonment because Goodwin was not a 
suitable candidate for probation; and (9) appellate review of the denial of a Rule 
35 motion involves a determination of whether a defendant's sentence was 
reasonable at the time of pronouncement or whether the defendant has shown that 
his or her sentence is excessive in light of additional information submitted in 
support of the motion. 
Id at 273, 61 P.3d at 630. The Court concluded that dismissal was proper because there was no 
reasonable possibility that Goodwin's sentence would have been reduced had he appealed, 
"particularly in light of the severity of Goodwin's offense, his character and criminal record, and 
the standard applied by Idaho appellate courts in reviewing the denial of a Rule 35 motion." Id at 
274, 61 P.3d at 631. 
Just as in Goodwin, dismissal is proper here because petitioner cannot demonstrate that 
counsel knew or should have known that a rational defendant in their client's position would 
have wanted to appeal. The facts here are remarkably similar to Goodwin in that the information 
that Mr. Neville knew or should have known included: (l)Leytham pled guilty to two felonies 
(2) Leytham's sentence was within the statutory sentencing range; (3) Mr. Leytham's offense 
involved taking more than $50,000 from an elderly victim and stealing a woman's purse; (4) by 
pleading guilty Leytham indicated a desire to end judicial proceedings; (5) in his Rule 35 motion, 
Mr. Leytham did not challenge the legality or excessiveness of his sentence, or submit any 
additional evidence to support his motion, but merely requested that the district court reconsider 
the sentence imposed; (6) Mr. Leytham's presentence investigation report indicated that he had a 
significant criminal record, with numerous felonies involving stolen property; (7) the presentence 
investigator recommended imprisonment because Leytham was not a suitable candidate for 
probation. (Tr., pg. 30, ln.11 to pg. 31, ln.22); (Tr., pg. 62, Ins. 1-19); (Tr., 35 ln. 24- pg. 36, ln. 
7). 
Here, the Court should dismiss petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel. There was no 
reasonable possibility that Mr. Leytham's conviction would have been overturned or that his 
sentence would have been reduced had he appealed, particularly because of the severity of Mr. 
Leytham' s offense and his character and criminal record. 
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5. The Court should dismiss Petitioner's implied claim that his plea was made while 
under the influence because none of the Petitioner's medications impaired his ability 
to enter an informed guilty plea. 
The record undermines any argument that petitioner's medications impaired his ability to 
enter a plea. Consequently, the claim should be summarily dismissed without an evidentiary 
hearing. To determine whether a plea is knowing, voluntary, and understood 
entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in 
the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) 
whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial 
to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) 
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). Courts should consider all of the 
relevant surrounding circumstances contained in the record to determine if a guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary. 
For example, the Court in Workman v. State relied on the record dismissing the 
petitioner's claim that his plea was involuntary because his medication impaired his ability to 
enter a plea. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527-28, 164 P.3d 798, 807-08 (2007). There, 
petitioner had been medicated at plea entry and the district judge had, 
an opportunity at that time to question Workman to determine his competence and 
rational understanding of the proceedings. The district judge thoroughly 
documented the evidence in the transcript of the hearing at which Workman 
changed his plea and noted her personal observations that "[t]hroughout the 
hearing, Workman answered the Court's questions appropriately; moreover, he 
exhibited no behavior that indicated an inability to concentrate or an impairment 
of his motor or cognitive skills." 
Id. The Supreme Court concluded that, based on the record, Workman's claim alleging his 
medication rendered his plea involuntary was insufficient to raise an issue of material fact; 
therefore "district judge did not err in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, Workman's 
claim that his plea was involuntary." Workman v. State, 528 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007) 
Just like in Workman, here the record demonstrates that Petitioner's medications did not 
impair his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. At the plea hearing, Petitioner's 
attorney pointed out that petitioner was on medication, including high cholesterol medication, 
depression medication, and naproxen and hydrocodone for neck pain. (Tr., pg. 10, ln.2 to pg. 14, 
ln.6). Petitioner's attorney noted that any concern he had over the entry of plea was "more based 
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on what he might be taking than how he was talking .... I didn't see anything that would make 
me believe anything other than he was being strictly rational." (Tr., pg. 11, lns.6-12). In 
response, the Court inquired into the possible effect of petitioner's medication, asking Petitioner: 
Q. Now you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression and some 
other medications and some Hydrocodone for your neck pain; is that correct? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. And you've been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45 days 
you said. 
A. Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005. 
Q. Okay. Normally by this time any of these medications any effects have been 
stabilized. But I just want to make sure you are having any sleepiness or any 
difficulty understanding what we are talking about today? 
A. No, Your Honor. 
Q. Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion - these medications made you 
more susceptible to those? 
A. No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you. 
Q. You misunderstood my question? 
A. Yes, ma' am. 
Q. Okay. And these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions? 
A. Yes, ma' am. 
Q. And again, just for the record, his answers seem appropriate to me, his affect is 
appropriate. We've got great contact. He's not slurring his words. He doesn't' 
appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. 
(Tr., pg. 19, ln.25 to pg. 21, ln.14 ). After examining the Petitioner regarding his medication, the 
Court asked questions regarding his mental health and whether he understood the consequences 
of pleading guilty. (Tr., pg. 21, ln.24 to pg. 22, ln.20). Having examined the Petitioner to see if 
his medication or mental health had affected his ability to enter a plea, and having examined 
petitioner's understanding of the plea deal, the district judge concluded that the "guilty plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily given." (Tr., pg. 32, ln.8). 
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Based upon the colloquy between the Court and Mr. Leytham, there is ample evidence 
that Petitioner's plea was knowingly and voluntary, and that he had a rational understanding of 
the proceedings. The District Court's examination into petitioner's mental capacity and 
understanding of his plea indicates that neither the Court, defense attorney, nor Petitioner himself 
believed the medications affected his understanding of his guilty plea. Consequently, Petitioner's 
claim that medications affected his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea should be 
dismissed pursuant to summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The State moves for dismissal of each and every claim. Post-conviction proceedings 
need not, in every circumstance, proceed to an evidentiary hearing. In fact, when "it appears 
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of 
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," the Court may grant a motion for 
summary disposition. LC. §19-4906(c). Such is the case here and the State hereby moves the 
Court to dismiss the petition in its entirety. 
-0:-
DATED this;Qday of July 2015. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
~
By: Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFIC~~I_ OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this cf!:day of July 2015, I caused to be served, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Dismissal upon the individuals named below in 
the manner noted: 
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St. Room 1107, 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
~.BY depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the office 
of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By fuxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at h~ 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, the petitioner, Jimmy D. Leytham, by and through counsel, Lance 
Fuisting, of the Ada County Public Defender's Office and herein objects to the State's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal to his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906( c) 
on the basis that genuine issues of material fact have been raised by the petitioner in his 
pleadings which require an evidentiary hearing to be held and that his petition for post conviction 
relief should be granted. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Leytham's claims involved allegations that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during his guilty plea and sentencing. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees 
a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
685-86 (1984). Idaho has adopted the Strickland two-prong test in evaluating whether a criminal 
defendant was denied the right to effect assistance of counsel. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59 
(2004). Specifically, a defendant must prove both that his or her counsel's performance was 
deficient, and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his or her case. Id. To show 
deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that his or her attorney's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To show prejudice, the defendant must show 
a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the 
case would have been different. Id. A defendant must prove his claims by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Id. at 56. Even if individual claims do not independently show prejudice, the 
Court must consider whether the accumulation of error creates the degree of prejudice entitling a 
petition to relief. Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F .2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). 
When assessing the reasonableness of counsel's decisions, this Court owes deference to 
counsel's strategic decisions; however, "[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices 
were strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 481 
(2000) ( citation omitted). 
Mr. Leytham asserts all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged satisfy both 
prongs of the Strickland analysis. Specifically, Mr. Leytham's claims for relief show (1) a 
deficiency in trial counsel's performance, and (2) that Mr. Leytham was prejudiced by the 
deficient performance. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Mr. Leytham alleges that 
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even if some individual claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice independently, when 
considered collectively, the accumulation of error creates prejudice entitling him to relief. 
Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief, either upon the motion of a party or at the court's own initiative. Martinez v. 
State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Idaho App. 1995). Summary dismissal is 
permissible only if the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, which, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Id. If such a factual 
issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Id. 1 
1 The State has argued in its Motion for Summary Dismissal that Mr. Leytham's claims are clearly disproven by the 
record. Several of Mr. Leytham's claims involve communications or lack thereof with his counsel in the underlying 
criminal case, and many of those claims are not addressed in the record. On May 26, 2015, Mr. Leytham requested 
that this Court allow him to conduct a deposition of his counsel on the underlying case to address the issues he has 
presented which are not in the record. This Court denied the Motion for Discovery on June 3, 2015. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a 
failure to investigate the issues in his case? 
II. Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a 
failure to advise him correctly about his guilty plea? 
III. Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a 
breakdown in communications between himself and counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure 
to investigate the issues in his case. 
Trial counsel must conduct a reasonable investigation. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
523 (2003). ("[W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision ... was 
itself reasonable." (emphasis in in original) (citation omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 
(holding that counsel has a "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary"); Conner v. Quarterman, 4 77 F .3d 
287, 296-94 (5th Cir. 2007). (The judgment is whether counsel's investigation was reasonable, 
not whether counsel's trial strategy was reasonable.") (citation omitted). 
The most glaring and prejudicial deficiency regarding a failure to investigate involved 
counsel's failure to obtain Mr. Leytham's medical records. In page 2 of Mr. Leytham's Second 
and Final Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Leytham states: 
12) I told Mr. Neville about my medical conditions. 
13) Mr. Neville did not attempt to obtain my medical records. 
14) There was no proof about my medical conditions to supply to the Court at the 
time of sentencing. 
The lack of documentation of medical conditions was clearly viewed as an aggravating 
factor by this Court at the Sentencing Hearing held on December 31, 2014. (Transcript of 
Proceedings December 31, 2014, The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, pp. 50-53) (Hereinafter, TR. 
December 31, 2014). At that hearing, the following exchange occurred after Mr. Neville 
attempted to explain some of Mr. Leytham's medical conditions to the court: 
THE COURT: 
MR. NEVILLE: 
We never got copies of any medical records other than Dr. Verska and 
then the letter from his internist; is that correct? 
That's correct. 









So these are just what he says. 
Correct. 
Thank.you. 
However, I - - well, from what he's telling me, this foot surgery is 
something that's been diagnosed in his recent stay. 
Also, I think the thing he's suffering from the most is his lupus. 
Where is the evidence that he has lupus? 
Well, just an example, I think the Ada County Jail has even called in a 
specialist recently on this because they're not finding - - they're not being 
successful in treating it. I can attest that any time - -
Because his internist does not list lupus as a diagnosis and he's not taking 
medication for lupus. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I am. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to - - I'm not asking you. 








The only medical record that I have - - I have nothing from the jail. The 
only medical records that I have is the undated letter from Dr. Verska 
which doesn't tell me anything other than he's not capable of working. 
And the other letter I have is from the other doctor, which I can go back 
and figure out what the name is, and he indicates he has allergies - - I'm 
trying to remember. The medication he's taking is for allergies. 
Your Honor, if I could ask my client. 
Well, I'm not - - to be honest with you, I haven't found your client to be a 
very honest person based on what's in this presentence and the fact that 
we have - - we have pictures of him stealing, so 
I understand. 
I know he writes this stuff. 
MR. NEVILLE: I understand. 




-- but that doesn't tell me anything. 
I understand the Court is-doesn't have much reason to believe him .... 
(TR. December 31, 2014, p. 51 L.6-p.53 L. 6). 
The relevant inquiry under the case law is whether it was a reasonable decision not to 
investigate the medical conditions and provide documentation to the Court prior to attempting to 
argue them to the Court at the sentencing. In terms of prejudice to Mr. Leytham, this failure to 
conduct an investigation offered the Court another opportunity to question Mr. Leytham's 
credibility and what could have become a mitigating factor at sentencing became an aggravating 
factor. Therefore, it was an unreasonable decision not to obtain the medical records, which 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel on both Strickland prongs.2 
II. Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure 
to advise him correctly about his guilty plea? 
A defendant's constitutional right to counsel extends to the "critical stages" of 
proceedings. US. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25, 87 S.Ct 1926, 19 L Ed. 1149 (1967). "Before 
deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent 
counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed 2d 284 (284). 
Mr. Leytham has alleged numerous deficiencies on behalf of counsel in regards to advice 
regarding his guilty plea. On page 2 of his First Affidavit of Petitioner, Mr. Leytham makes the 
following claims regarding his guilty plea: 
13. When I spoke to Mr. Neville in person, he explained that he had this "great deal" worked 
out for me. I explained to Mr. Neville that I did not want to enter into a guilty plea as I 
was not guilty. 
2 The medical records were subsequently obtained by Mr. Leytham's Post Conviction counsel and filed as an 
addendum to his Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 on April 28, 2015. That 
motion was denied without objection from the State on April 30, 2015. 
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14. Mr. Neville informed me," .. hey, do not worry about it, just plead guilty and they are 
going to give you probation." 
15. At the time I appeared before the Court, the Court read to me the Guilty Plea Advisory 
Form. When I was asked if," ... there has been any type of promises to you," Mr. 
Neville told me to say there was no promises. I asked about the probation he had 
promised. Mr. Neville told me," ... that is not what the Court is asking about." 
16. I informed Mr. Neville, "sir, I need some time to think about this". Mr. Neville told me, 
"Hey, this is a done deal, you are going to get probation, so you have about 15 minutes, 
just plead guilty and you will get probation." 
17. I did as my attorney advised me to do. I entered the plea of guilty. However, when the 
Court sentenced me, I received a sentence of ten (10) years ... 
The State has pointed out that Mr. Leytham's allegations in his affidavit are not 
consistent with his answers on the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, nor are they consistent his 
answers to the Court during his guilty plea. Mr. Leytham has indicated that he did not fill out the 
Guilty Plea Advisory Form entirely on his own and that he was being advised to answer the 
Court's questions a certain way by his counsel during his guilty plea. Most of the conversations 
with his attorney to which he alludes are not a part of the record. Mr. Leytham has attempted to 
conduct discovery during his post conviction case to clarify these issues of fact; however, this 
Court has denied his request. Because his allegations create genuine issues of fact that would 
have amounted to ineffective assistance during his guilty plea, which is a critical stage of the 
proceedings, he should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
The same holds true for Mr. Leytham's allegations about Mr. Neville claiming to have a 
positive social relationship with the judge. We know what Mr. Leytham has said in his affidavit, 
but we have not formally heard Mr. Neville's side of that discussion. Again, a deposition would 
have been helpful. The State has argued that even if that allegation was true, it would have 
worked to Mr. Leytham's benefit. Clearly, given Mr. Leytham's dissatisfaction with his 
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sentence, whatever situation existed did not work to his benefit. However, an evidentiary 
hearing is required to determine this issue of fact because it is not a part of the record. 
III. Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a 
breakdown in communications between himself and counsel. 
The Idaho appellate courts have recognized the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for counsel's failure to communicate. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 768, 185 P.3d 921, 924 
(Idaho App. 2008). Mr. Leytham has made several allegations related not only to failure to 
communicate, but also what could be deemed unreasonable communications under Strickland. 
In his First Affidavit, Mr. Leytham makes the following allegations: 
9. I was scheduled for a court hearing on September 10, 2014. I spoke to Mr. Neville and 
he told me that he would contact me on the ih of September to see if I could reschedule 
the court date on the 1 oth. 
I asked this to be rescheduled because I had a job out of town and I did not know if I 
could get back before the court date. 
10. Mr. Neville never did contact me as to whether or not my court date was rescheduled. 
11. When I returned from out of town, I did make it to my court date on the 1 oth of 
September, 2014. However, Mr. Neville did not show up. He forgot about me and my 
court date. A Mr. Brian Blender filled in for Mr. Neville; but Blender did not know about 
my case. 
12. My wife called Mr. Neville's telephone several times to find out what was going on and 
what happened to him at the court date. There was never any type of return call from Mr. 
Neville. 
In his Second Affidavit, Mr. Leytham makes the following allegations regarding lack of 
or ineffective communications: 
4. On the day I plead guilty, September 10, 2014, Brian Blender, who works with Mr. 
Neville, appeared to represent me. 
5. I did not know Mr. Blender would be appearing prior to September 10, 2014. 
6. I only had a 7 to 10 minute discussion with Mr. Blender prior to pleading guilty on 
September 10, 2014. 
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7. Mr. Blender and I did not discuss restitution on September 10, 2014. 
8. I was taking numerous medications at the time of my change of plea. 
9. I believe the medications I was taking on September 10, 2014, impacted my ability to 
understand the proceedings. 
10. I initially informed the Court that the drugs I was on made me more susceptible to 
suggestions from Mr. Blender during my change of plea on September 10, 2014. 
15. Neither Mr. Neville or Mr. Blender explained to me that I had a right not to participate in 
the presentence investigation process. 
16. There was no discussion about the restitution amount during my change of plea hearing. 
17. At sentencing, my attorney agreed to $55,331.92 in restitution for uncharged conduct on 
my behalf. I was never asked if I agreed to that amount. 
18. I believed the restitution was $202.75. That was the amount in my presentence report. 
19. My attorney did not show me the presentence report until the day of sentencing. 
20. My attorney only showed me Dr. Arnold's evaluation on the day of sentencing. 
21. I was unable to read the presentence report and evaluation myself because of a medical 
condition. 
22. I do not believe my attorney read me Dr. Arnold's evaluation in its entirety. 
23. I do not believe my attorney thoroughly reviewed the presentence report and evaluations 
with me. 
24. My attorney only read the recommendations section of the presentence report to me. 
25. I was advised not to say anything when I had the opportunity to address the Court at 
sentencing. 
26. Neither Mr. Neville nor Mr. Blender spoke to me about my right to appeal my sentence. 
27. No appeal of my sentence was filed. 
While there is an indication from the record that there was some degree of 
communication between the attorneys and Mr. Leytham, it is important to consider the 
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reasonableness of that communication based on the fact that Mr. Neville made the following 
statement about Mr. Leytham at sentencing: 
"I do not think Mr. Leytham is somebody who sees himself as a liar. I do think he has an 
extremely hard time with his memory. From one conversation to the next he does not 
track nor does he remember what we've talked about." (TR. December 31, 2014, p.53). 
Moreover, at the change of plea hearing on September 10, 2014, Mr. Blender made the following 
statement to the court regarding whether he had reason to believe that Mr. Leytham was under 
the influence of alcohol or medication: 
"He-there were some other medications. He may not know what they are that he could 
be under the influence of, but he seems mostly rational." (Transcript of Proceedings, 
September 10, 2014, The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, p. 10, L. 6-9). 
At no point did either counsel request that Mr. Leytham's competency be evaluated or 
that proceedings be continued in spite of making the record that he does not remember their 
conversations and that he might be taking medications that "he could be under the influence of." 
In State v. Cobb, it was error for the district court to summarily dismiss the defendant's 
application for post conviction relief without granting an evidentiary hearing, where there existed 
a material issue of fact as to whether the defendant was under the influence of prescribed drugs 
which affected his ability to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. 100 Idaho 
116, 594 P.2d 154 (1979). In light of the knowledge that both counsel had of Mr. Leytham's 
issues, it was not objectively reasonable for them to proceed with a guilty plea or sentencing 
under the circumstances, nor was it objectively reasonable to proceed with substitute counsel 
who only had a short period of time to meet with Mr. Leytham prior to his entry of a guilty plea. 
Mr. Leytham has indicated that he did not want to plead guilty, but he did so based on 
representation from counsel that he would receive probation. We have no real evidence to 
controvert his claim, which mandates an evidentiary hearing. 
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Additionally, it is clear from the record that the significantly-higher restitution amount 
for the uncharged conduct was never mentioned in open court at either hearing prior to the 
judgment, nor was Mr. Leytham ever personally asked on the record ifhe agreed to that amount. 
There is not clear evidence in the record to controvert Mr. Leytham's claim about the 
amount of time his attorney spent with him reviewing the presentence materials, although the 
transcript suggested that that discussion did happen close to the time of sentencing. 
It is clear from the record that no appeal of Mr. Leytham's sentence was filed. A 
defendant's right to representation by counsel extends to all critical stages of his trial, including 
appeal. Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359, 883 P.2d 714 (Idaho App. 1994). Mr. Leytham 
contends that he never had any discussions about an appeal with either attorney. We do not 
know what the attorneys' position is on that claim. All of these questions of fact suggest that an 
evidentiary hearing is appropriate. 
Conclusion 
The State's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because genuine issues of 
material fact have been raised by the petitioner in his pleadings which require an evidentiary 
hearing to be held and his petition for post conviction relief should be granted. 
Lance Fuistin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~ day of August 2015, I mailed (served) a true 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Shawna Dunn 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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AUG 2 8 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clc,r~ 
'3v KRISTI DUMOti . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRifCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL 
On February 25, 2015, Jimmy Leytham, filed a Petition pro se1 and requested the Court 
appoint counsel. The Court granted his request that same date. The Court held a status conference 
and at Leytham's request continued the status conference to allow him to file a Rule 35 in the 
underlying cases. The Court stayed proceedings pending the Rule 35 decision. His new counsel 
filed the Rule 35, and the Court denied his Rule 35. 
At the continued hearing, his counsel requested more time and the Court rescheduled the 
scheduling conference again to June 17, 2015. 
Leytham moved for discovery, more specifically allowing him to take depositions of his 
trial counsel which the Court denied. 
Leytham did not amend his Petition. The State answered and moved for summary dismissal 
on June 17, 2015. On August 24, 2015, Leytham replied to the State's motion. 
The Court takes judicial notice of the following documents from the underlying criminal 
action, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-3478/CR-FE-2014-5269: Guilty Plea Advisory Form completed by 
Leytham, presentence report (including LC. § 19-2522 evaluation), Clerk Minutes dated November 
1 "Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty. v. 
Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003). Prose litigants are not accorded any special consideration 
simply because they are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v. 
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375,383 (2007); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 
(1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 
Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385,388 n.5 (1987). 
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12, 2014, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-5269, transcripts dated September 10, 2014 (guilty plea) and 
December 31, 2014 (sentencing). 
Based on the following, the Court grants the State's motion and dismisses Leytham's 
Petition. 
BACKGROUND 
Leytham pled guilty to the two cases on September 10, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement 
where the State agreed to not charge him as a persistent violator and agreed to dismiss several 
charges. The State was free to ask for a prison sentence for up to ten years. Leytham agreed to pay 
all restitution even on the dismissed charges and on DR#2014-41186I.2 The State also indicated it 
was investigating other similar cases. 
Before entering the plea, Leytham completed the Court's3 written guilty plea form. 
Leytham testified that he reads and understands English and that he actually reviewed the form and 
agreed with the circled answers. He also testified that it was his signature on the front and back of 
the form and he had initialed the statement of rights. Finally he testified that the answers were true 
and correct. 
He also testified that he had reviewed all of that evidence, that he understood that by 
pleading guilty he was admitting the truth of all the allegations. Leytham also testified that there 
was nothing that he had asked his attorney to do that he had not done and that he was waiving all 
defenses, both factual and legal. Leytham testified that he understood that the Court could impose 
up to nineteen (19) years without possibility of parole and that the Court was not bound by any 
recommendation made by either his trial counsel or the State. 
Among other things during the plea hearing, Leytham also agreed that he had had enough 
time with his attorney, had fully discussed all the facts and circumstances of the charge, and that 
he was satisfied with his attorney's services. Leytham also agreed that he admitted to the truth of 
the charge as stated in the Count I and that he was guilty of the acts and conduct charged. He also 
answered the subsequent questions in the written guilty plea form as follows: 
2 This investigation involved his defrauding Washington Federal Savings and is the restitution imposed in Case No. 
CR-FE-2014-3478. 
3 It was actually the Honorable Judge Rippler's form. 
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10. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial the ONE paragraph 
below which describes the type of plea you are entering. DO NOT INITIAL 
BOTH PARA GRAPHS: 
a. I understand that the court is NOT bound by the plea agreement or any 
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized by law, 
including the maximum sentence stated above. Because the court is not bound by 
the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not 
have the right to withdraw my guilty plea. JL 4 
*** 
14. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that has not been done? 
YesDNo0 
*** 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive any defenses, both factual and 
legal, that you believe you may have in this case? Yes 0 No D 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that you believe should still be filed 
in this case? Yes D No 0 
If you answered "yes," what motions or requests? ____________ _ 
23. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are admitting the truth of 
each and every allegation contained in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? 
Yes 0No D 
*** 
40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, can force you to plead guilty 
in this case? Yes 0 No D 
41. Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily? Yes 0No D 
42. Are you pleading guilty because you committed the acts alleged in the information or 
indictment? Yes 0 No D 
*** 
44. Has any person (including a law enforcement officer or police office) threatened you or 
done anything to make you enter this plea against your will? 
Yes D No 0 
If your answer is "yes," what threats have been made and by whom? 
45. Other than in the plea agreement, has any person promised you that you will receive 
any special sentence, reward, favorable treatment, or leniency with regard to the plea you 
are about to enter? Yes D No 0 
4 This was in Leytham's handwriting. 
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If your answer is "yes," what promises have been made and by whom? 
46. Do you understand that the only person who can promise what sentence you will 
actually receive is the Judge? Yes 0 No D 
Has the Judge made any promises to you? Yes D No0 
47. Are you satisfied with your attorney? Yes 0 No D 
48. Have you answered all questions on this Questionnaire truthfully and of your own free 
will? Yes 0 No D 
49. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions in this form which you could 
not work out by discussing the issue with your attorney? Yes D No 0 
50. IF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, do you understand that 
by pleading guilty you are presumptively deportable, meaning that you will be removed 
from the United States and returned to your country of origin, and lose your ability to 
obtain legal status in the United States, or be denied an application for United States 
citizenship? YES NO NIA 
51. Do you swear under penalty of perjury that your answers to these questions are 
true and correct? Yes 0 No D 
(Emphasis in the original.) At the end of the form he affirmed the truth of his questionnaire as 
follows by signing the bottom of the form: 
I have answered the questions on pages 1-8 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form 
truthfully. I understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each 
question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and 
voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do so. 
Leytham signed the form and dated it on September 10, 2014. Before accepting his plea, the Court 
engaged in the following colloquy with Leytham regarding the crimes: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Q. All right. And now I understand you filled out some of this guilty plea form 
in your own handwriting; is that right? 
A. Yes, I did, Your Honor. I think he already circled about three squares and I 
did everything else. 
Q. Okay. So just the ones that he circled; is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Okay. Well, I'm -- I'm going to go through this to make this these are your 
answers. 
Now, that's your signature I see on the front and back; is that right? 
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A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And when we talk about the statement of rights, I see what looks like initials 
with a J and an L Are those your initials? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. And did you read those paragraphs before you initialed them? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. 
A. 
And so those are not your attorney's initials? 
No,ma'am. 
Q. Did you have any trouble understanding what those portions of the guilty 
plea form meant? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Now, you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression as well 





Yes, Your Honor. 
Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings? 
No, ma'am. 
Q. And you have been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45 
days you said? 
A. Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005. 
Q. Okay. Normally by this time in any of these medications any effects have 
stabilized. But I just want to make sure are you having any sleepiness or any 
difficulty understanding what we're talking about here today? 
A. No, Your Honor. 
Q. And do you feel that these medications prevented you from knowingly and 
voluntarily deciding to plead guilty? 
A. 
Q. 
No, Your Honor. 
Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion -- these medications made 




No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you. 
You misunderstood my question? 
Yes,ma'am. 
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Q. Okay. And so these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And, again, iust for the record, his answers seem appropriate to me, his 
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He 
doesn't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there 
anyone here who would disagree with that? 
MS. DUNN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blender? 
MR. BLENDER: No, Your Honor. I agree with what he said. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leytham? 
THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma 'am. 
THE COURT: Great. 
Q. BY THE COURT: Now, a couple more questions. You're under the care of Dr. 
Fred Rice; is that right? 
A. Yes, I am. He is one of my clients plus he's also a psychologist and I talk to 




Well, who is prescribing the depression medication? 
That would be my doctor, Dr. Fox, Michael Fox out of Kuna Advanced 
Q. Okay. So you've been seeing these people for some time? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. What was the diagnosis that you got? You said you were diagnosed in 1979. 
Tell me what that was. 
A. 
Q. 
I'm a schizophrenic and a split personality, ma'am. 
Okay. So what are you taking for schizophrenia?5 
A. Nothing. I grew out of that within years. 
Q. Okay. Is there anything else that you think might affect your ability to 




Now, you understand I'm not required to follow this plea agreement? 
5 The Court ordered an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation and the psychologist diagnosed him with Dysthymic Disorder with a 
provisional diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. He also diagnosed him with a Personality Disorder and 
Borderline Intellectual functioning. Nothing in the evaluation suggested he was not competent. 
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A. Yes, ma'am, I understand. 
0. What that means is I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in the 
forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card case 
and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the 
possibility of parole. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you 
understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Now, you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these 
cases including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes,ma'am. 
Q. And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case, 20 
14-41 1861. Do you understand that? 
A. Which one would that be, ma'am? 
Q. 
A. 
That's the one that -- it's the one that they're not going to file on. 
Yes. 
Q. All right. And you understand again that because these are two crimes that I 
can run them consecutive to each other? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. You also understand that if I don't follow this plea agreement, you will not 
be allowed to withdraw your guilty plea? Do you understand that? 
A. I understand. 
Q. You understand the only person who can make any promises to you as to 
what's going to happen at sentencing is me? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Have I made you any promises? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney 
provided during discovery? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Is there anything that your attorney has -- that you've asked your attorney to 
do that he has not done? 
A. No, ma'am. 
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Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
0. Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime? 
A. No,ma'am. 
Q. Now, you said - you answered no and then underneath it says if you 
answered yes, have you told your attorney who those witnesses are and you said 
yes. But there aren't any witnesses, are there, who could show you were innocent? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Now, you understand that because this is an unconditional guilty plea, you 
would not be able to challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea 
including any search or seizures that occurred in this case or any issues about the 
manner of arrest or any statements that you made? Do you understand that? 
A. Yes,ma'am. 
Q. Now, you've indicated that you've waived your right to appeal the judgment 
as part of your plea agreement and my understanding of the plea agreement you are 
not waiving that. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. So you can still - if you don't like my sentence, you can appeal that. Do 







Q. Are there any promises that have been made to you that influenced your 




-- besides the plea agreement? 
A. No. 
0. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you waive -- you give up all 
of your defenses including factual and legal defenses? Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Are there any motions that you think your attorney should have filed? 
A. No, ma'am. 
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Q. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you're admitting the truth of 
each and every allegation to those charges to which you plead guilty? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
(Emphasis added.) The Court accepted his plea as knowingly and voluntarily given and set the 
case for sentencing. The Court set sentencing for November 12, 2014. 
On November 12, 2014, Leytham and his trial counsel, Mr. Neville, appeared. At this point 
the Court and counsel had read the presentence report where Leytham attempts to minimize his 
involvement in these crimes and claim innocence. The Court, Mr. Neville and Leytham discussed 
his new claim. Mr. Neville requested the Court order an evaluation pursuant to LC. § 19-2522, 
which the Court did. The Court also rescheduled his sentencing. see Clerk Minutes dated 
November 12, 2014, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-5269. The Court asked Leytham whether he 
committed the crimes and he indicated that he did and volunteered to the Court that he was not 
coerced and that there was no evidence of any kind that anyone forced him to plead guilty. Id. 
On December 31, 2014, the Court sentenced Jimmy D. Leytham in CR-FE-2014-3478 on 
Count II., Forgery, Felony, LC. § 18-3601, to an aggregate term often (10) years, with a minimum 
period of confinement of five (5) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody 
not to exceed five (5) years. The State dismissed Counts I and III, Forgery, as part of a plea 
agreement and the Court ordered restitution in the amount of $55,331.92. 
That same date, the Court sentenced Jimmy D. Leytham in CR-FE-2014-5269 on Count II, 
Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, LC. § 18-3125 to an aggregate term 
of five (5) years, with a minimum period of confinement of zero (0) years, followed by a 
subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed five (5) years. The State dismissed 
Count I, Grand Theft, Felony, LC.§ 18-2403(2)(c) and agreed to not have him charged a persistent 
violator. The Court ordered that this case run consecutively to CR-FE-2014-3478.6 The Court 
further ordered restitution in the amount of $202.75. 
Leytham's post-conviction counsel, Lance Fuisting, timely filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence pursuant to Rule 35, LC.R., on April 28, 2015. Leytham appealed. 
That appeal is pending. 
6 Leytham is technically only pursuing post-conviction relief in case number CR-FE-2014-00034 78. 
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This was at least Leytham' s 8th felony conviction which included Burglary (1978 7, 1979), 
Issuing a Check Without Funds (1978), Disposing of Stolen Property (1979), Escape from a 
Penitentiary (1979), and Grand Theft (1982). While the Court recognized that his last criminal 
felony conviction was in 1982, in this case, CR-FE-2014-3478, the victim, a very elderly man, 
hired Leytham as a handyman over several years. The evidence established that Leytham 
repeatedly altered the checks written to him. For example, he altered a check from $25 to $2500, 
another from $96.50 to $960.50, and another from $400 to $2400. Evidence was presented at 
sentencing that Leytham had even accompanied the victim to the bank and tried to get him to 
withdraw $10,000 and the teller, being suspicious, would only allow the elderly man to withdraw 
$5,000. 
In CR-FE-2014-5269, he stole a woman's purse in a Walmart and then was caught trying to 
withdraw $300 from her ATM. At sentencing, he claimed he "found" her purse and was trying to 
simply "deposit" the credit card in the ATM. However, he is actually seen on video stealing her 
purse and seen trying to withdraw $300. While awaiting sentencing the State received more reports 
of potential stealing from another elderly man for whom he worked as a handyman. 
This post-conviction petition followed. 
ANALYSIS 
A post-conviction petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a civil 
proceeding governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 
202 P .3d 642, 646 (2008). A petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 
172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c). Furthermore, admissible evidence supporting the 
applicant's allegations must accompany the post-conviction petition, otherwise the application is 
subject to dismissal. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, _, 348 P.3d 145, 150-51 (2015); State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing LC.§ 19-4903). In fact, a petition for 
post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or 
the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. Heilman v. 
7 Amended from Embezzlement. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL 





























State, 158 Idaho 139, _, 344 P.3d 919, 924 (Ct. App. 2015); LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the 
petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the 
petition will be subject to dismissal. Id. citing Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 
1172 (Ct. App. 2011). Leytham's Petition and supporting affidavits do not comply with this 
requirement. 
The State moved for summary dismissal and Leytham opposed, requesting an evidentiary 
hearing. LC. § 19-4906.8 Leytham claims ineffective assistance of counsel and generally claimed 
as follows: 




Trial counsel failed to adequately advise him on all matters necessary to enter an 
informed guilty plea; 
Trial counsel and Leytham's relationship broke down; 
Trial counsel failed to inform Leytham of his rights and responsibilities under the 
plea deal prior to entry of plea and misled him as what the court would do. 
Leytham also claims, without any evidence to support his claims, that his medications impaired his 
ability to enter an informed guilty plea. 
The Court finds he failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether his representation was ineffective. 
When considering summary dismissal, the Court must construe disputed facts in the 
petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory 
allegations or factual assertions, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's 
conclusions oflaw. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth 
v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App.1986). Moreover, the Court, as the 
trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary disposition; rather, the Court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn 
from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 
(Ct.App.2008). 
8 Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to 
a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by 
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima 
facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify 
relief as a matter of law. Keserovic v. State,_ Idaho_, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028-29 (Ct. App. 2015); 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). If the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the 
petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim 
may not be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Only where a 
genuine issue of material fact exists must the Court hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the 
factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. The Court finds that neither party 
demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact exists. Therefore, the Court denies Leytham' s 
request for an evidentiary hearing. 
At its core, Leytham's claim for post-conviction relief is a claim for ineffective counsel. He 
also claims that his guilty plea was coerced. 
A. Ineffective assistance of counsel standards. 
There are two general categories of ineffective assistance of counsel and each is governed 
by a different standard. While he is not explicit, a close reading of his claims shows that Leytham 
makes claims under both. The first type is sometimes referred to as "actual ineffective assistance 
of counsel" and is based on specific actions or omissions by counsel that resulted in prejudice to 
the defendant. This is the more common ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the standard 
applied to such claim is generally set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
The second category is often referred to as per se ineffective assistance of counsel or a 
Cronic claim. See US. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). Cronic only applies to circumstances 
in which the defendant was actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel and in such 
cases, prejudice to the defendant is presumed and need not be established in order to be entitled to 
relief. 
Leytham casts most of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims as Strickland claims. 
1. Strickland claims. 
In order to succeed on a claim of "actual ineffective assistance of counsel," Leytham must 
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meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Mitchell v. 
State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To prevail on this claim, Leytham must 
demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692; Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. While parties 
often focus on the first prong, critically examining every decision made by trial counsel, they 
virtually ignore the more important Strickland requirement -- prejudice. Even those decisions that 
result from "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings" do not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel absent clear prejudice. 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a court does not second-guess 
strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 
6 P .3d 831, 834 (2000). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the 
wide range of professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 
(1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1176 (1988)). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) (quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 
Idaho 280,282, 32 P.3d 672,674 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
"'Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.' Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. ----, ---- [130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284] (2010). An ineffective-
assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and 
raise issues not presented at trial [or in pretrial proceedings], and so the Strickland 
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry' 
threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to 
serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even under de novo 
review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. 
Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, 
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing 
counsel, and with the judge. It is 'all too tempting' to 'second-guess counsel's 
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.' Id, at 689 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052]; see 
also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). 
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The question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence 
under 'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices 
or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-40 (2011). Likewise, in another recent United States Supreme 
Court case, the Supreme Court emphasized again how deferential a reviewing court should be to 
trial counsel because: 
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and 
forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must 
be applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial inquiry" threaten the 
integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even under de nova review, the 
standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a 
later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of 
materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, 
and with the judge. It is "all too tempting" to "second-guess counsel's assistance 
after conviction or adverse sentence." Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question 
is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 
"prevailing professional norms," not whether it deviated from best practices or most 
common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 -788 (2011). 
In other words, it is not enough for Leytham to simply show that his attorney's errors had 
some conceivable effect on his case because virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet 
that test; he must show the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. "The 
likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S.Ct. at 792 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 
1403 (2011) ("highly deferential" look at counsel's performance). It is not sufficient for counsel on 
post-conviction to merely argue that trial counsel conducted the trial or other proceedings 
differently than post-conviction counsel would have done. It is not even good enough to point out 
that trial counsel committed a mistake in the law or the facts. Instead, post-conviction counsel 
must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different but for the deficient performance. 
Even if that is established, Leytham must still prove by a preponderance of the evidence "a 
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 565, 149 P.3d 833, 840 (2006) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. As the United States Supreme Court wrote in 
Strickland: "[i]n making this determination [referring to the prejudice prong], a court hearing an 
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." 466 U.S. 
at 696. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland carefully analyzed the prejudice required in 
order to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: 
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment. Cf United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 
667-668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981 ). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in 
counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution. 
*** 
It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel 
would meet that test, cf United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866-
867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), and not every error that 
conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the 
result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors 
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That standard, 
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed an error, 
"impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate 
because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to 
warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-93 (emphasis added). 
In fact, the prejudice component is so significant that a court is not required to even 
analyze whether a trial counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice aspect. 
In addressing the prejudice component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the United 
States Supreme Court made the following observation: 
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness 
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an 
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
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showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness 
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect 
will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that 
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire 
criminal justice system suffers as a result. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added). Throughout Leytham' post-conviction argument, he 
focuses on his trial counsel's performance substituting his judgment on strategic decisions and 
virtually disregards whether any of their strategic decisions prejudiced his case. 
As the United States Supreme Court observed, judicial scrutiny of trial counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential because it is too easy for a court examining trial counsel's 
defense after that defense has proven to be unsuccessful to conclude that a particular act or 
omission was unreasonable. Cf Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134, (1982). 
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim 
of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court 
must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In 
making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function, 
as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing 
process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize 
that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 
These standards require no special amplification in order to define counsel's duty to 
investigate, the duty at issue in this case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, 
strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case. a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances. applying a heavy measure of 
deference to counsel's judgments. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691 (emphasis added). 
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2. Cronic claims. 
In contrast, Cronic was a companion case to Strickland. While the Strickland standard is 
appropriate for the overwhelming majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Cronic 
recognized that in rare circumstances counsel's conduct may be so bad that it is per se ineffective. 
Here, Leytham claims that the relationship between his trial counsel and him broke down to the 
point he failed to subject the case to meaningful adversarial testing. This is a Cronic claim. In 
Cronic, the Supreme Court reasoned that, "absent some effect of challenged conduct on the 
reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated." 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. The circumstances in which prejudice could be presumed are limited. 
Those circumstances include: 
[M]ost obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that 
counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the 
accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial. Similarly, if counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there 
has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process 
itself presumptively unreliable. 
Id. at 659. In summary, Cronic delineated three limited circumstances to which the per se rule 
would apply: (1) state or court actions, (2) failure to subject the case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, and (3) conflict of interest. 
If state actions result in an actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel, prejudice 
may be presumed. Leytham does not allege that any state actions or court actions caused an actual 
or constructive denial of assistance of counsel. Examples encompassed by Cronic include denial of 
counsel at a critical stage of the case9 or appointing new counsel a day before trial in a high profile 
capital murder case. 10 
B. Leytham's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail. 
1. The Court dismisses Leytham's failure to investigate claim. 
Leytham claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his alleged 





9 Where a defendant was prohibited by the court from consulting with his attorney during an overnight recess of the 
trial, the Supreme Court found prejudice was presumed. See Geders v. US., 425 U.S. 80 (1976). 
10 See e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, the mere tardy appointment of counsel does not 
automatically require reversal of every conviction. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
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changed the Court's sentence. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 92 P.3d 542 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). 
Moreover, the record also belies his complaint. According to the record, the Court 
discussed the adequacy of the investigation during the plea hearing, inquiring in part, as follows: 
Q: Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney 
provided [sic] during discovery? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: Is there anything that your attorney has-that you've asked your attorney to 
do that he has not done? 
A: No, ma'am. 
Q: And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these 
crimes? 
A: Yes, ma'am 
Q: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: 
A: 
Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime? 
No, ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.8.) Furthermore, while he quotes from a part of the record, the 
transcript is taken out of context. The Court was merely observing that there was no basis for his 
present claims at sentencing that he was suffering from some major illness like Lupus. It was not 
critical to sentencing and was collateral at best. 
Finally, Leytham in fact presented all of his medical records to the Court in support of his 
Rule 35 and the Court denied his motion even in the face of these medical records. Therefore, he 
cannot prove any alleged failure prejudiced him or affected the outcome. 
This claim fails and the Court dismisses it. 
2. The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel failed to adequately advise 
him with regard to entering a guilty plea. 
Leytham generally claims his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly. He 
supports this allegation by claiming his trial counsel misrepresented what the Court would do at 
sentencing. He also claims trial counsel failed to advise him about his appellate rights. Finally he 
claims his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the restitution 
he agreed to pay. 
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a. Allegation that he was misled as to his sentence does not support post-
conviction relief 
Leytham claims he pied guilty because counsel assured him he would receive probation; 
however, the record demonstrates that Leytham pied guilty knowing that probation was not 
guaranteed and that he was facing a potential nineteen (19) year sentence without possibility of 
parole. Leytham was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State could argue 
for imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.) To which the 
State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, In. 15.) The Court explained the plea was not 
binding directly with Leytham. The following exchange occurred: 
Q: What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in 
the forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card 
case and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the 
possibility of parole. Do you understand that? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you 
understand that? 
A: Yes ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 23, Ins. 3-14). Clearly, Leytham knew that that there was the possibility of a prison 
sentence. 
This is significant because, even assuming that his trial counsel failed to adequately explain 
the potential sentence,11 the Court's careful colloquy with him, plus the guilty plea form he filled 
out under oath, establishes that he knew a prison sentence was possible. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court recently ruled, where the Court adequately informs a defendant and the record conclusively 
proves he was informed properly by the Court, a petitioner cannot establish that the outcome 
would have changed but for his attorney's ineffectiveness. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 167-68, 
321 P.3d 709, 717-18 (2014). Here the record clearly proves Leytham understood the Court was 
free to impose the sentence it did. 
Applying the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Booth, Leytham has also failed to 
demonstrate that " there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
11 For the purposes of this decision the Court has assumed Leytham's factual assertion to be true, thus making an 
evidentiary hearing unnecessary. 
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pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621, 262 
P.3d 255,264 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010)). 
Thus, the Court dismisses this claim. 
b. Allegation that his trial counsel failed to advise him about his appellate rights 
does not support post-conviction relief. 
Leytham complains that his trial counsel failed to advise him about his appeal rights. 
However, like the previous claim, the record clearly establishes that the Court in fact advised him 
both in writing and verbally that he had a right to appeal and that it must be filed within forty-two 
( 42) days. The Court stated at the end of sentencing as follows: 
Now, you have the right to appeal my decision. If you wish to appeal, you have to 
do so within 42 days of the date judgment is made and filed. In making that appeal 
you may be represented by an attorney. And if you cannot afford one, one will be 
appointed to represent you at public expense. 
(Tr., pg. 64, lns. 14-20). Likewise, the Court's judgments clearly set forth Leytham's appeal rights. 
While the failure to advise a defendant of his appeal rights would fall below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, Leytham cannot show that it prejudiced him because this Court unmistakably 
did advise him. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68, 321 P.3d at 717-18. 
Therefore, even assuming his claim to be true, like the previous claim, the Court dismisses 
it. 
c. Allegation that his trial counsel failed to advise him about the amount of 
restitution does not support post-conviction relief. 
Leytham now claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not adequately 
advise him about the potential restitution. However, the plea agreement expressly included 
restitution as a condition of the plea agreement, even on the dismissed charges and on DR# 2014-
411861.12 Both the Court and the State placed the restitution requirement on the record. (Tr., pg. 4, 
lns. 10-15.). The Court specifically clarified that as part of the plea agreement Leytham agreed to 
pay restitution on all of the dismissed charges, restitution on case DR-20 14-41181, with such 
restitution being subject to a civil judgment. (Tr., pg. 4, ln.10 to pg. 6, In. 23; pg. 8, lns. 15-25). 
After describing the restitution he agreed to pay by pleading guilty, the Court confirmed with 
12 This investigation involved his defrauding Washington Federal Savings and is the restitution imposed in Case No. 
CR-FE-2014-3478. 
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defense counsel that the Court's understating was "an accurate reflection of the plea agreement." 
(Tr., pg. 8, lns. 1-3). 
Moreover, the Court specifically inquired whether Leytham understood that he was 
agreeing to pay restitution by pleading guilty. 
Q. Now you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these 
cases including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case, 
2014-411861. Do you understand that? 
A. And which one would that be, ma'am? 
Q. That's the one that- it's the one that they're not going to file on. 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., pg. 23, ln.15 to pg. 24, ln.l). The Court continued: 
Q. And do you understand again about the requirement that you're going to 
have to pay restitution to your victims? 
A. Yes ma'am. 
Q. And I noticed that you crossed yes and then it looks like over no it says --
you wrote L -- it looks like a signature but I'm not positive. It looks like an initial. 
But do you understand that you have to pay restitution to the victims? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 27, lns. 7-17). 
Restitution ultimately amounted to $55,331.92 and $202.75 in Leytham's cases. Leytham 
clearly acknowledged that he understood that he was obligated to pay restitution, including on 
DR#2014-411861, and that he was aware of the amount of restitution. He acknowledged this 
responsibility multiple times directly to the Court and through his attorney. Furthermore, Leytham 
agreed that he had access to discovery documents that indicated restitution would be significant in 
his cases. The restitution amounts are in those discovery documents. The exact amount ultimately 
agreed to, $55,331.92, is in police reports, DR#2014-411861, which were provided to Leytham 
and his counsel prior to the plea. Leytham testified he had reviewed the discovery prior to the plea. 
Leytham's attorney stated as follows: 
THE COURT: Is that -- is the amount of restitution, is that something he's going to 
be agreeing to? 
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MR. NEVILLE: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you believe there's a sufficient basis to impose those 
amounts? 
MR. NEVILLE: I do. 
(Tr., pg. 36, Ins. 8-14). As the State noted, the same police reports were also in the presentence 
report which Leytham told the Court he had read. 
There is no evidence to support his conclusory claim that he and his counsel did not discuss 
the restitution amount, especially in the face of the record. Leytham' s application must present or 
be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be 
subject to dismissal; there is no requirement that the court give evidentiary value to mere 
conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 
612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct.App.1982). 
Id. 
Under these circumstances we hold that, to justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-
conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual 
showing based upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. His 
application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to 
give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based 
upon otherwise verifiable information. Absent the witnesses or verifiability of the 
facts to which they could testify, we hold the application fails to raise material 
issues of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. 
The Court dismisses this claim and finds it does not support post-conviction relief. 
3. The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
advise him about his Estrada rights. 
Leytham claims that his trial counsel failed to advise him that he had a right to remain 
silent during his presentence report investigation. However, this will not sustain post-conviction 
relief because, even if true, the guilty plea advisory form he completed and the Court's colloquy 
with him when it took his plea clearly establish that he was informed by the Court. They prove that 
Leytham understood his right to remain silent during all the examinations before pleading guilty. 
As discussed above, the Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed a similar Estrada claim 
arising in a similar context. Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 168,321 P.3d 709, 718. 
There, the Court held, where the record establishes a defendant fully understood his 
or her Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them; the defendant fails to establish 
prejudice by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of a different result had the 
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attorney's representation not been deficient. Id at 168, 321 P.3d at 718. The 
situation here is analogous to that in Murray. Grant was aware of his right not to 
participate in the evaluation and has failed to demonstrate how having his attorney 
additionally advise him of this right would have made any difference. Thus, Grant 
failed to allege the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the district court properly 
refused to appoint counsel on this claim. 
Grant v. State, 329 P.3d 380, 387, 156 Idaho 598, 605 (Ct. App. 2014). Therefore, while a failure 
to inform him of his Estrada rights would fall below 
The Court dismisses this claim and finds it does not support post-conviction relief because 
he cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure, if any. While such a failure would fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, Leytham cannot show that it prejudiced him because this 
Court unmistakably did advise him. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68, 321 P.3d at 717-18. 
4. The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
reviewing his presentence report with him. 
Leytham argues his attorney provided ineffective assistance by not reviewing the 
presentence investigation report with him. First, the record indicates that when asked by the Court 
during sentencing whether he had read the presentence report, Leytham said "yes, ma'am." (Tr., 
pg. 37, Ins. 3-5). The Court later asks his attorney whether shared a copy of the I.C. § 19-2522 with 
Leytham and his attorney, Mr. Neville stated: 
I have, Your Honor. And it think it's important I put on the record he was not able 
to read that just due to some health problems, so I actually read it to him. 
(Tr., pg. 37, Ins. 4-7). When asked whether there were corrections, again his counsel noted a 
correction to the 19-2522 evaluation, implying that Leytham brought that to his attention. 
Second, like the defendant in Jones v. State, while he complains that his counsel was 
ineffective by failing to go over the presentence report with him, assuming that to be true, he fails 
to identify what errors or omissions, if any, he would want corrected or what information he would 
have introduced. He fails to explain how this alleged failure affected the outcome or the "resulting 
prejudice". 
now that Jones has seen the report, he has failed to allege in his application for 
post-conviction relief what errors, if any, appear in the presentence investigation 
report and any resulting prejudice. Under the summary dismissal procedure as 
outlined by LC. § 19-4906( c ), the court may grant a summary dismissal if there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Even assuming the facts alleged in Jones' affidavits are true, Jones 
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has failed to allege any errors or corrections he would have made at sentencing. 
Because he has failed to indicate what errors were contained in the presentence 
report that resulted in prejudice, Jones is not entitled to relief. Therefore, the state, 
as a matter of law, is entitled to summary judgment. The district court did not err in 
summarily dismissing the application for post-conviction relief on these g 
Jones v. State, 870 P.2d 1, 3, 125 Idaho 294,296 (Ct. App. 1994) 
Like Jones, he is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this basis and the claim is 
dismissed. 
5. The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective by telling 
him to remain silent at sentencing. 
Leytham complains that his trial counsel was ineffective because he advised him to be 
silent when the Court asked whether he wanted to make a statement. For the purposes of this post-
conviction, the Court assumes this to be true. (The Court notes that he also wrote a letter to the 
Court which the Court considered and made part of the presentence report with the consent of 
counsel.) This does not entitle him to post-conviction relief. 
Advising a client not to speak during sentencing is a tactical decision. Leytham did not 
show or even argue his counsel's choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any 
shortcomings in counsel's knowledge or preparation." Buck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 
634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993). Assuming it happened and that it was not a strategic decision not to be 
second guessed on post-conviction, Leytham also introduced no evidence of what he would have 
said that would have affected the outcome. In other words, he has not identified any prejudice. 
The Court dismisses this claim. 
6. The Court dismisses Leytham' s claims related to an alleged breakdown of his 
relationship with his trial counsel. 
Leytham claims his relationship with his trial counsel broke down and as a result his 
counsel was ineffective, making Cronic potentially applicable. 
The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between a client and 
his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). However, forcing a defendant to go to trial 
with an attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict amounts to constructive denial of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). An 
irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs only where there is a complete 
breakdown in communication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents 
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effective assistance of counsel. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). 
Disagreements over strategic or tactical decisions do not rise to level of a complete breakdown in 
communication. Id. 
In this case, even assuming the relationship to have been strained, the record is clear that 
there was not a complete breakdown of communication. Furthermore, Leytham failed to identify 
what resulted from that alleged breakdown. Therefore, this claim fails. 
c. There is no evidence that his medications affected his ability to enter his plea. 
Like the defendant in Workman, while not explicitly argued, Leytham suggests that his plea 
was involuntary because his medication. However, other than his bald assertion, Leytham does not 
support his claim with any admissible evidence, especially in the face of the record. Leytham's 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or 
the application will be subject to dismissal; there is no requirement that the court give evidentiary 
value to mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Drapeau, 103 
Idaho at 617, 651 P.2d at 551. 
Under these circumstances we hold that, to justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-
conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual 
showing based upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. His 
application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to 
give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based 
upon otherwise verifiable information. Absent the witnesses or verifiability of the 
facts to which they could testify, we hold the application fails to raise material 
issues of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. 
Id. The record also belies his assertions. This is the colloquy the Court had with Leytham while he 
was under oath. 
Q. Now, you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression as well 




Yes, Your Honor. 
Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. And you have been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45 
days you said? 
A. Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005. 
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Q. Okay. Normally by this time in any of these medications any effects have 
stabilized. But I just want to make sure are you having any sleepiness or any 
difficulty understanding what we 're talking about here today? 
A. No, Your Honor. 
Q. And do you feel that these medications prevented you from knowingly and 
voluntarily deciding to plead guilty? 
A. No, Your Honor. 
Q. Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion -- these medications made 






No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you. 
You misunderstood my question? 
Yes,ma'am. 
Okay. And so these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions? 
Yes,ma'am. 
Q. And. again. just for the record. his answers seem appropriate to me. his 
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He 
doesn 't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there 
anyone here who would disagree with that? 
MS. DUNN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blender? 
MR. BLENDER: No, Your Honor. I agree with what he said. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leytham? 
THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Great. 
Q. BY THE COURT: Now, a couple more questions. You're under the care of a 
Dr. Fred Rice; is that right? 
A. Yes, I am. He is one of my clients plus he's also a psychologist and I talk to 





Well, who is prescribing the depression medication? 
That would be my doctor, Dr. Fox, Michael Fox out of Kuna Advanced 
Okay. So you've been seeing these people for some time? 
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A. Yes, ma' am. 
Q. What was the diagnosis that you got? You said you were diagnosed in 1979. 
Tell me what that was. 
A. 
Q. 
I'm a schizophrenic and a split personality, ma'am. 
Okay. So what are you taking for schizophrenia?13 
A. Nothing. I grew out of that within years. 
Q. Okay. Is there anything else that you think might affect your ability to 
understand the questions or make a decision in this case? 
A. No, ma'am. 
(Tr., pg. 19, ln.25 to pg. 22, ln.24) (emphasis added). 
Leytham does not claim he was not competent to enter a guilty plea and, in fact, there is no 
evidence he was not competent. The issue is whether Leytham knowingly, willingly, and 
voluntarily entered a guilty plea. 
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was 
entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. State v. Heredia, 144 
Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2007). Whether a plea is voluntary and 
understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was 
voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not 
coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to 
a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading 
guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626,628 (1976). 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527-28, 164 P.3d 798, 807-08 (2007). Like Workman, Leytham 
suggests that his guilty plea was involuntary because, at the time he entered it, he was medicated. 
However, the colloquy clearly establishes that Leytham had the mental capacity and understanding 
and he aware that he was medicated but did not believe the drug affected his understanding of his 
guilty plea. 
In fact, the Court carefully put on the record its own observations and asked whether 
anyone disagreed. Even Leytham agreed with the Court's observations. 
Q. And. again. ;ust for the record. his answers seem appropriate to me. his 
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He 
13 The Court ordered an LC. § 19-2522 evaluation and the psychologist diagnosed him with Dysthymic Disorder with a 
provisional diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. He also diagnosed him with a Personality Disorder and 
Borderline Intellectual functioning. Nothing in the evaluation suggested he was not competent. 
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doesn't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there 
anyone here who would disagree with that? 
(Emphasis added.) In fact, Leytham stated as follows: 
THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma'am. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, is not a basis to grant him post-conviction relief and the Court denies his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the Petition, and any evidence in a light most favorable to Leytham and 
having considered the oral argument, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Leytham is not entitled 
to post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material 
fact and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Repp v. State, 136 Idaho 262, 
_, 32 P.3d 156, 157-58 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, the Court hereby grants the State's motion 
and dismisses Leytham's Petition. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 28th day of August 2015. 
lt.uu... 6-f! 'ii, 
Cheri C. Copsey, District J~e 
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LANCE L. FUISTING, ISB #7791 
Deputy Public Defender 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against 
him in the above-entitled action on August 28, 2015, the Honorable Cher C. 
Copsey, District Judge presiding. 
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under, and pursuant to, IAR 11 (a)(1-9). 
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal 
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal is: 
a) Did the District Court err in granting summary dismissal of Mr. 
Leytham's Post Conviction claims? 
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4) Reporter's Transcript. The Appellant requests the preparation of the entire 
reporter's standard transcript as defined by IAR 25(c). The Appellant also 
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript: 
a) Status Conference hearing held June 17, 2015 (Court Reporter: Maria 
Glodowski. Estimated pages: 50). 
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant 
to IAR 28(b)(1). In addition to those documents automatically included under 
IAR 28(b)(1), Appellant also requests that any briefs, statements or affidavits 
considered by the court, and memorandum opinions or decisions of the court 
be included in the Clerk's Record. 
6) I certify: 
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
Reporter(s) mentioned in paragraph 5 above. 
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the Appellant is indigent. (I.C. §§ 31-
3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)). 
c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(10)). 
d) Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, 
as the client is indigent (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)). 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to IAR 20. 
DATED this <]-b1't day of Septembe-r-20 ___ [ 5_. l___..___~t.___- ------
Lance L. Fuisting 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Public Defender shall be appointed to represent the above-named Petitioner in all 
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ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL 1 
000134
e e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed one copy of the Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender on Direct 
Appeal as notice pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this 
case in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir. 
Statehouse Mail 
Idaho Appellate Public Defender 
3050 North Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Shawna Dunn 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Ada County Public Defender 




CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By ~ l Ii__ A[_~~:~ 
Deputy Clerk:, .~~ · , c: ·· . ,. 










By K12LL12 D. AICH. 
Dep;%$Gf2N£2R , Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
vs. 
JifvlMY D. LEYTHAM, 
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT 
Docket No. 43551-2015 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on October 27, 2015, 
pursuant to Court order, a transcript of the proceedings 
before the Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, on June 17, 2015, 
(8 pages in length) was lodged with the District Court 
Clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District for 
inclusion in the above-entitled appeal. 
~~~,,, .. -, 
M&M COURT REPORTING 
000136
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43551 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Transcript of proceedings held September 10, 2014 and December 31, 2014, Boise, 
Idaho, filed April 22, 2015 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 28th day of October, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
. .,,,,, ........ ,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RJ~rtH lUD1;'1,, 
Clerk of the Distric1fg_g~•· 0 ••••• •• 4/',., 
~ C) • •• ~ ,:, 
.. I"~ • • ~ -
~ ~ .• ~\\E STATS• v1 ~ 
: f.... • Q~ ~ t', : ~Ll0·u: ·~-
By~ :c!~ 
Deputy Clerk ;t;. . lD AH o l [J $ -.... ~ .. . .. -:.v. •• ~~~ 
.... 4 •••••••••• .... ~ .. . ,, 1 <:::,'J .. . ,,,,,ND FOR ADI\\,,,, ,,,.,. .... ,,,, 
000137
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43551 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: QCT 2 8 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICM,''"111111111,,, 
Clerk of the District C,.0lirt\ l\'l.;~.:V.D10; 11,, 
., ~"- • • .r.4 " 
. ~ C)',J •• •• '< .,, 
~ G .•• •.. \ 'L : f-.., : X ,y\-\E STA rs~~ ~ . uJ •Cl): By ..R.. · • - o E - : ::j : 
.. i:..z.... • ~ -
Deputy Clerk ; t:, \ 10 AH O _: r; : -=-~·. .. ""'i$ ':. .. .. ~ ... 
",, ~ ,1 ••••••••• .,~I\ .... . , ·,;1,/\ c;C)" .. . 
,,, u FOR AD r,.. ,, ,, ,,, 
,,,,,. .. u,1' 
000138
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43551 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
8th day of September, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~,,111111111''1,,, 
Clerk of the District CQ~~'\ !:!!.:?b1c{'1,,, .... ~ •• •.?.-,, .. ,-',) .. . . .,~ ,:. 
~'"'· •.-c. -\CW : ~ .. ox 'tHE STAro•. d ,:. ~.~: .. • • Cl'l • By "-~-o:i;:- •-3: 
D Cl k ';r-'• ::;,:,: eputy er ; c/) \ IDAHO : ....., : 
-~· .[? ... -:. .,.... .. .. ,, ~ ,~ •• •• 4...:, 
,, "' •••••••• ..l,.'\ .. . , 4't> o~'~ .. .  
,,,, FOR AD~ c; ,,,, ,,,,,, ..... ,,,, 
